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Michael Bertrand: Metaphysical Constraints: Theory And Explanation 
(Under the direction of L.A. Paul) 
 
This dissertation consists of three papers introducing and defending the notion of 
metaphysical constraint. Each paper is centered on a different set of theoretical or 
methodological roles played by metaphysical constraints by which they earn their keep.  
In my first chapter, I introduce the puzzle of unequal treatment: why is it that among 
the intuitive threats to a view, some are thought to be serious trouble while others are treated 
as mere invitation for further work? I argue that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to 
introduce the notion of metaphysical constraint. This solution indicates a general 
methodological role for metaphysical constraints. In this spirit, I argue that metaphysical 
constraints back a familiar way of developing metaphysical theories, what I call the IPA 
method. In addition, I argue that many existing metaphysical debates are well understood as 
debates about metaphysical constraints. 
In my second chapter, I identify and account for a before-now unrecognized kind of 
metaphysical explanation backed by metaphysical constraints, which I call metaphysical 
explanation by constraint. I argue that metaphysical explanations by constraint belong to a 
novel category of metaphysical explanation and are different in kind from more widely 
appreciated metaphysical explanations underwritten by the grounding relation. Metaphysical 
explanations by constraint show that grounding-centric views of metaphysical explanation 
are incomplete while revealing an interesting structural similarity between scientific and 
metaphysical explanation.  
iv 
In my final chapter, I provide a general case against a familiar form of argument 
often called the Argument from Absence of Analysis. When applied to some entity x, the 
Argument from Absence of Analysis concludes that x is likely to be a primitive entity on the 
basis of our persistent actual failure, or failure in principle, to provide a reductive account of 
x. However, I claim that the argument rests on the dubious assumption that reduction and 
primitivism are the only dialectical options with respect to x and so is fatally flawed. To do 
this, I offer a way of providing explanatory characterizations that are backed by metaphysical 
constraints. I argue that constraintist views are neither reductive nor primitivists but preserve 
the advantages of each kind of view. As a result, they promise to occupy previously 
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This dissertation introduces the notion of metaphysical constraint and defends it on the 
basis of its theoretical and methodological utility. In it, I develop and defend the idea that 
metaphysical constraints improve our understanding of the methodology of metaphysics by 
revealing the foundations for familiar methods of theory development. I argue that they guide and 
shape existing metaphysical debates, aid in the development of new metaphysical theories, solve 
outstanding puzzles, and underwrite novel explanations.  
 Metaphysical constraints, as I understand them, are constitutive parts of the natures of their 
objects. So, a metaphysical constraint on some x is just part of what it is to be x and is the case in 
every possible world in which x exists. They constrain their objects by placing limits on the way in 
which they can be instantiated across possible worlds. Metaphysical constraints are ideological 
innovations that require no additional ontological commitment over and above a commitment to 
natures. I contend that they earn their keep as parts of our ideology by providing a new and useful 
way of thinking about the world that extends our understanding of metaphysics.  
 In particular, metaphysical constraints generate new resources that can be used to better 
understand and to make progress in a broad range of seemingly disparate first order debates. In 
doing this, metaphysical constraints illustrate a general lesson that ought to be taken to heart: that by 
improving our understanding of the way in which metaphysical theories function and are developed, 
we can better see our way to progress in first-order philosophical debates.  
 2 
The body of this dissertation consists of three related chapters, each of which illustrates the 
theoretical and methodological utility of metaphysical constraints by illuminating theoretical roles 
that they are well suited to play. The first of these shows the way in which metaphysical constraints 
serve as the driving force behind a widely accepted account of the methodology of metaphysics. It 
also shows how employing the notion of metaphysical constraint can aid in the resolution of several 
outstanding methodological issues. The second and third chapters attend to the explanatory role 
played by metaphysical constraints. In them, I argue that metaphysical constraints underwrite a 
novel kind of metaphysical explanation, and I claim that their capacity to underwrite explanatory 
characterizations of their objects without reducing them opens a distinctive pathway by which 
metaphysical theories can be given. This approach retains the advantages of reduction and 
primitivism while avoiding their costs.  
 The first chapter, ‘Metaphysical Constraints and the Aims of Metaphysical Inquiry,’ begins 
with a puzzle about the way in which metaphysicians handle intuitive claims. Among the intuitive 
threats to a particular view, why are some thought to be serious trouble while others are mere 
invitations for further work? Though this puzzle of unequal treatment resists several familiar 
solutions like those that appeal to differences in strength, scope, or centrality, I show that it can be 
solved by metaphysical constraints. In short, intuitive threats are treated unequally because those 
threats that are serious trouble feature a clash of purported metaphysical constraints while no such 
clash is featured in threats that invite further work.  
 This solution is indicative of a more general methodological role for metaphysical 
constraints. In that spirit, I argue that metaphysical constraints underwrite a widely accepted method 
of contemporary metaphysics, by which theories are developed via the exploration of possible 
worlds. Using the metaphysics of free will as a case study, I show how this method proceeds by 
identifying, making precise, and then assessing candidate metaphysical constraints by testing them 
 3 
against possible worlds that serve as apparent counterexamples. I apply the insight gained from this 
to a familiar metaphysical dispute concerning the nature of causation, in order to explain why this 
debate unfolds in the way that it does. I claim that which positions are available in this debate, as 
well as what strategies are available for addressing counterexamples, is determined in part by the 
structure of the metaphysical constraints involved.  
 In the second chapter, ‘Metaphysical Explanations by Constraint,’ I identify and account for 
a previously unrecognized kind of metaphysical explanation underwritten by metaphysical 
constraints. It is increasingly well recognized that, in addition to causal explanations that work by 
providing information about causal mechanisms or histories, some facts can receive distinctively 
metaphysical explanations. However, attention paid to these metaphysical explanations has focused 
almost exclusively on grounding explanations: those that work by providing information about what 
grounds what. I argue that not all metaphysical explanations are grounding explanations. In order to 
show this, I identify and offer an account of metaphysical explanations by constraint. Unlike grounding 
explanations, metaphysical explanations by constraint get their explanatory power by showing their 
explananda to result from a metaphysical constraint so that they must, of metaphysical necessity, be 
the case.  
 I begin by identifying a structural similarity between scientific and metaphysical explanations. 
Some scientific explanations are generative or bottom-up: they work by describing the processes by 
which their explananda were generated or produced. Others work from the top-down and so explain 
by subsuming their explananda under more general principles, thereby showing how particular 
occurrences fit into the broader scheme of things. In much the same way, I claim that some 
metaphysical explanations are generative: grounding explanations work by identifying the 
metaphysical mechanisms by which their targets come about.   
 4 
 Just as there is a metaphysical analogue to generative explanations in science, there is a 
metaphysical analogue to top-down scientific explanation in the form of metaphysical explanations 
by constraint. Metaphysical explanations by constraint are not generative and so belong to a novel 
category of metaphysical explanation. Unlike grounding explanations, which work by providing 
information about the way in which their targets are generated, metaphysical explanations by 
constraint subsume their targets under more general metaphysical constraints and so bring about a 
kind of unification in the course of their work.  
Metaphysical explanations by constraint offer illuminating explanations of familiar 
phenomena. However, they also promise to extend the explanatory reach of metaphysics by 
licensing new explanations that are not accessible in other ways. I suggest that metaphysical 
explanations by constraint are available in at least some cases where corresponding grounding 
explanations are absent or deficient. Finally, the very existence of distinctive metaphysical 
explanations by constraint show that grounding-centric views of metaphysical explanation are overly 
narrow and so impoverish our understanding of the way in which a metaphysical explanation can be.  
In the third chapter, ‘Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism and Reduction,’ I discuss a 
powerful and widespread argument in favor of ontological primitivism called the Argument from 
Absence of Analysis. When applied to some entity x, the Argument from Absence of Analysis 
concludes that x is likely to be a primitive entity on the basis of our persistent actual failure, or 
failure in principle, to provide a reductive account of x. Instances of the Argument from Absence of 
Analysis are used to support primitivism, for example, about mental phenomena, temporal passage, 
composition, causal relations, intrinsicality, and moral goodness. Unfortunately, the argument is 
fatally flawed: it rests on the dubious assumption that reduction and primitivism exhaustively 
characterize the dialectical options with respect to x.  
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In order to show this, I propose a way of providing a metaphysical account of some target, 
x, by providing an explanatorily deep characterization of x backed by metaphysical constraints. 
Constraintist theories like these provide explanatory characterizations of their objects, that is they 
provide information about what it is to be them, by identifying the metaphysical constraints to 
which they are subject. I argue that metaphysical views underwritten by metaphysical constraints are 
neither reductive nor primitivist. In doing this, I offer some much needed clarification of ontological 
reduction and primitivism by identifying some commitments that I take to be constitutive of each. 
My strategy is to show that constraintist theories need not adopt these constitutive commitments.  
Instead, constraintist theories preserve what is best about reductive and primitivist views 
while avoiding the costs of each. Because they are not reductive, constraintist views are not hostage 
to the success of reductive analysis. However, they promise explanatorily deep characterizations of 
their objects and so do what primitivist theories cannot. Because they are distinct from primitivist 
and reductionist views, constraintist views open up previously unexplored space in which new and 
interesting metaphysical theories might be found. I consider a case study drawn from the debate 
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1. The Puzzle of Unequal Treatment 
 
 Not all philosophical intuitions are created equal.  
 Consider a pair of intuitive threats to the classical Russellian account of meaning on which 
meaning is simply a matter of reference.1 First, the Russellian account is threatened by the intuitively 
obvious fact that some names are empty: names like ‘Harry Potter’ or ‘Pegasus’ seem to have 
meaning without referring to anything. Second, the Russellian account is threatened by what we call 
‘Frege’s puzzle’ i.e. the intuitively obvious fact that sentence pairs, like ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus,’ can have different meanings even though there is no difference in the 
reference of any expressions in them. Though they each purport to show that the Russellian view is 
false, these intuitive threats are not treated equally. Our intuitions about empty names stand as an 
invitation for the Russellian to do further work, while our intuitions about the sentences motivating 
Frege’s puzzle are often treated (as they were by Frege) as a fatal problem for the Russellian.2 
                                                
1 It is worth noting that this view is distinct from Millian accounts of meaning, according to which words get their 
meaning directly from the world rather than by standing for objects in the world.  See Caplan 2006. 
 
2 Meinong’s famous response is perhaps the best-known example in which empty names are treated as invitations for 
further work. Fictionalism provides another avenue of response as well. More sophisticated, Millian or direct reference 
accounts of proper names are also afflicted with the problem of empty names and to similar effect. As with the classical 
Russellian account, proponents acknowledge the problem and attempt to explain it away or, alternatively, to argue that 
the direct reference account is the superior in spite of its problem with empty names (Brock 2004, Katz 1994, Ryckman 
1988, Fitch 1993, Salmon 1988). For examples in which Frege’s Puzzle is treated as serious trouble, see Brock 2004, 
Carney 1980 and Kawczynski 2014. Though solutions to Frege’s Puzzle have been proposed on behalf of direct 
reference theorists, they represent very significant departures from the classical Russellian account.  
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  Consider a pair of intuitive threats to the classical Lewisian account of causation on which 
the ancestral of counterfactual dependence is necessary and sufficient for causation. First, the 
Lewisian account is threatened by the intuitively obvious fact that some causes are preemptors: 
when Suzy’s rock hits the window before Billy’s does, it is clear that Suzy’s throw (and not Billy’s) 
causes the window to break.3 Second, the Lewisian account is threatened by the intuitively obvious 
fact captured by the intrinsicness of causation i.e. that whether Suzy’s rock causes the window to 
break does not depend on the wider world, like what is happening now in the House of Lords.4 
Though they each purport to show that counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation, 
these intuitive threats are not treated equally either. Our intuitions about preemption cases stand as 
invitations for the Lewisian to do further work, while our intuition concerning the intrinsicness of 
causation is often treated as a fatal problem for the Lewisian.5  
 Why is it that among the intuitive threats to a particular view, some are widely considered to 
be invitations for further work, while others are thought to be fatal? This is the puzzle of unequal 
treatment. We need to solve this puzzle in order to understand the principles that guide our use of 
intuitions in philosophy. But how do we solve it? In the remainder of this paper, I’ll show that in 
order to solve the puzzle of unequal treatment we need to introduce the notion of metaphysical 
                                                
3 This is a preemption case. In preemption cases, it is intuitively plausible that C causes E in spite of a backup process 
that would have brought E about in C’s absence. In the case sketched above, it is clear that Suzy’s throw (and not Billy’s) 
caused the window to shatter. But the window’s shattering does not counterfactually depend on her throw: if Suzy’s rock 
had not hit the window, it still would have broken because Billy’s rock would have hit it instead. 	
4 More generally, whether C causes E is a matter of E’s causal history (perhaps together with the natural laws) and does 
not depend on the wider world outside of it. This threatens the simple Lewisian account because counterfactual 
dependence is an extrinsic relation. If it is necessary for causation, then causation is extrinsic	too. But this is precisely 
what is forbidden if causation is intrinsic. The conflict between counterfactual dependence and intrinsicness reveals a 
deep intuitive tension that “creates serious trouble for any reductive treatment that wants to approach causation in a 
uniform manner” (Paul and Hall 2013, 248).			
5	For examples in which preemption cases are treated as invitations for further work, see Lewis 2000, Yablo 2002, Paul 
and Hall 2013. For examples in which intrinsicness is treated as serious trouble, see Paul and Hall 2013, 248 and Hall 
2004b.	
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constraint. This solution indicates a general methodological role for metaphysical constraints, which 
underwrite contemporary metaphysics. 
2a. Can We Solve the Puzzle by Appeal to Intuitive Strength? 
It might be thought that the puzzle of unequal treatment can be solved by appealing to 
differences in the strengths of the intuitions involved. It can be solved, so the suggestion goes, by 
showing that those threats that are serious trouble for a view are backed by strong intuitions, while 
those that are mere invitations for further work are motivated by intuitions that are weak by 
comparison. This is an application of the Lewisian thought that “when common sense delivers a 
firm and uncontroversial answer about a not-too-far-fetched case, theory had better agree. If an 
analysis … does not deliver the common sense answer, that is bad trouble. But when common sense 
falls into indecision or controversy … then theory may safely say what it likes” (Lewis 1986c, 194). 
 This solution does not work. It is not generally true that differences in the strength of our 
intuitions track the unequal treatment of intuitive threats. Those intuitive threats that are serious 
trouble for a view need not also be those with the most intuitive force; and invitations for further 
work need not be motivated by intuitions that are comparatively weak. In many cases, like in the 
Russellian account of meaning, the intuitions behind our objections seem equally strong despite their 
unequal treatment. In others, like the causation case, this kind of solution gets the unequal treatment 
precisely the wrong way around. It predicts that the intrinsicness intuition is serious trouble for our 
understanding of causation because it is strong while our intuitive judgments concerning preemption 
cases are weak by comparison. 
In fact, it is our intuitive judgments about preemption cases that seem to be the stronger 
ones. They are among those not-too-far-fetched cases for which common sense delivers a firm and 
uncontroversial answer. But they are invitations for further work nonetheless. In contrast, intuitions 
about the intrinsicness of causation are more easily shaken. The claim that causation is intrinsic is a 
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claim about every instance of the causal relation and so is a claim about far-fetched cases as well as 
familiar ones. It is unclear whether intuition is a good guide in these cases or about what precisely it 
takes for causation to be intrinsic more generally.6 
Even if differences in the strength of our intuitions had tracked their unequal treatment, it 
would not be clear that this solves the puzzle. We should not agree that denying strong intuitions is 
always serious trouble for a theory: intuitions are defeasible guides rather than fixed points that must 
be respected at all costs. So in order to explain why some intuitive threats are serious trouble by 
appeal to their comparative strength, we must first explain when it is that strong intuitions must be 
preserved and under what circumstances they need not be. Because strong intuitions need not 
always be preserved, mere differences in the comparative strength of intuitive threats is not enough 
to explain why some intuitive threats are serious trouble while others are not. Though it is true that 
some intuitions are stronger than others, differences in the strength of our intuitions cannot be used 
to solve the puzzle of unequal treatment. 
2b. Can We Solve the Puzzle by Appeal to Scope? 
 It might be thought that the puzzle of unequal treatment can be solved by appealing to 
differences in the scope of the intuitive threats involved. It can be solved, so the suggestion goes, by 
showing that those threats that are serious trouble for a view are trouble because they threaten the 
whole research program of which the view is a part. In contrast, those that are mere invitations for 
further work are narrower in scope: afflicting only the original view and its close relations.7 While a 
modification to the view can defuse a threat that invites future work, no possible modification can 
defuse a threat that’s serious trouble.  
                                                
6 There are difficult questions concerning what it takes for a property to be intrinsic and how it is that the causal relation 
counts as intrinsic, given its sensitivity to natural laws. For discussion of intrinsicness see Langton and Lewis 1998, 
Marshall and Parsons 2001, Sider 2001 and 2003, and Weatherson 2001. For a detailed discussion of the intrinsicness of 
causation see Paul and Hall 2013. 
 
7	I owe this strategy to an anonymous reviewer from Philosophical Quarterly. 	
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 Unfortunately, this solution also fails. It is not generally true that differences in the scope of 
intuitive threats track their unequal treatment. In particular, those intuitions that invite further work 
need not be narrower in scope than those that are serious trouble. In many cases, the causation case 
serves as an example, the intuitive threats to a view seem to have an equally broad scope despite 
their unequal treatment. Though the intuitive threat posed by preemption merely invites further 
work for the classical Lewisian account of causation, it does not have a narrow scope as the solution 
predicts. Instead, the threat posed by preemption extends beyond the classical Lewisian account and 
its lightly modified cousins and seems to afflict any account that claims that counterfactual 
dependence is necessary for causation.  
Cases of late and trumping preemption, for example threaten every extant counterfactual 
dependence account, including Lewis’ later covariation account and Yablo’s de facto dependence 
account (Lewis 2000, Yablo 2002, Paul and Hall 2013). It is far from clear that any counterfactual 
dependence account of causation can be devised that defuses the threat posed by preemption cases 
while retaining their reductive aspirations (Lewis 1986, Schaffer 2000, Paul and Hall 2013).8 
Nonetheless, the intuitive threat posed by preemption is an invitation for further work. On a 
widespread way of understanding preemption cases, the lesson they teach is that we ought to modify 
our view so that it is sensitive to the difference between genuine causes and preempted backups 
(Paul and Hall 2013). Though it is true that some intuitive threats have a broader scope than others, 
this observation is not sufficient to solve the puzzle of unequal treatment.   
 
2c. Can We Solve the Puzzle by Appeal to Platitudes or Conceptual Truths?    
 It might be thought, instead, that the puzzle of unequal treatment can be solved by appealing 
to the connection between intuitions, on the one hand, and platitudes or conceptual truths, on the 
other. Some intuitive threats to a theory implicate platitudes or conceptual truths about their 
                                                
8	For a clear and detailed discussion of these issues and others, see Paul and Hall 2013.	
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subjects while others do not. The puzzle can be solved, the suggestion goes, by showing that those 
intuitive threats that are serious trouble for a view implicate platitudes or conceptual truths about 
their objects. These betray a deep misunderstanding about the concepts involved. In contrast, 
objections that are mere invitations for further work do not involve platitudes or conceptual truths. 
While further investigation is required, these objections do not betray any deep conceptual 
confusion.  
 This solution, also, won’t do. Some intuitive threats that are serious trouble do not plausibly 
implicate conceptual truths or platitudes. Other intuitive threats do implicate them and are mere 
invitations for further work. Platitudes and conceptual truths do not make the difference here and so 
do not explain our unequal treatment.  
 The causation case shows this. Our causal judgments about preemption cases, like the case 
of Suzy and Billy, are platitudinous: common sense delivers firm and uncontroversial answers in 
these cases. Judgments like these plausibly constitute the core of agreement that must be shared in 
order for us to count as speaking the same causal language. Yet, the intuitive threat provided by 
preemption cases are mere invitations for the Lewisian to do further work.  
 In contrast, the intrinsicness of causation is not a platitude nor is it a conceptual truth. 
Conceptual truths are those truths such that “whatever cognitive work is necessary for 
understanding them is somehow already sufficient for knowing them to be true” (Williamson 2006). 
The intrinsicness of causation is plausibly not self-evident in this way: we can understand what it 
would be like for causation to be intrinsic without thereby knowing that it is.  
 That causation is intrinsic seems not to be a platitude either. It is surprisingly difficult to 
provide a defensible statement of the thesis that causation is intrinsic (see Paul and Hall 2013) and it 
is just as difficult to provide an adequate analysis of intrinsicness more generally. Intrinsicness is a 
philosophical term of art and it would be very surprising for it to turn out that our common sense 
	 12 
ideas about causation are inherently committed to taking a stand with respect to its application.9 
Because it can be denied that causation is intrinsic without changing the subject, it is quite 
implausible that in order for anything to count as a referent for our causal concept, that thing must 
be intrinsic. Yet, the conflict between intrinsicness and counterfactual dependence remains serious 
trouble for the Lewisian view that counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation.  
 In addition, there is a more general consideration that tells against this attempted solution to 
the puzzle of unequal treatment. The project of contemporary metaphysics is no longer the project 
of conceptual analysis: the emphasis has shifted from explicating concepts to explicating the nature 
of the things in the world. So, theories of causation, at least the kind of interest here, aim to tell us 
what the causal relation is like. Their primary aim is not to explicate our causal concept nor is it to 
tell us what the causal relation is like by way of explicating our causal concept (cf. Paul 2010, Paul 
and Hall 2013). As a result, even if it were the case that unequal treatment tracked platitudes or 
conceptual truths, it is not clear how this would explain the unequal treatment: why would it be more 
serious trouble to deny a platitude or conceptual truth than to deny some other intuitive judgment?  
2d. Can We Solve the Puzzle by Appeal to Centrality? 
 Some intuitions are central to our understanding while others are peripheral by comparison. 
It might be thought that the puzzle of unequal treatment can be solved, drawing inspiration from 
Quine, by showing that those intuitive threats that are serious trouble for a view are so because they 
are central while those that are invitations for further work are treated this way because they are 
comparatively peripheral.10 Although Quine himself offers no precise account of centrality, examples 
suggest that the centrality of a belief has something to do with its importance in organizing 
                                                
9 It is not surprising, however, that our judgments are sensitive to something much less precise in the neighborhood of 
intrinsicness, perhaps that causal connections do not depend on outside events in the wider world. This is one reason 
why we judge that Suzy’s throw and not Billy’s caused the window to break. 
 
10 Prima facie, this solution has much in common with Quine’s account of belief revision in the face of recalcitrant 
experience. See Quine 1953, Sober 2000.  
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experience. Perhaps, as Eliot Sober (2000) suggests, we might think of the centrality of an intuition 
as a function of its generality. Perhaps it is a function of its inferential role instead.  
 It is not clear in what centrality consists beyond these suggestive claims about organizing 
experience. As a result, it is not clear how centrality ought to be measured or applied to solve 
particular instances of the puzzle of unequal treatment. However, it seems to me that any solution in 
terms of centrality, understood along these lines, will not do justice to cases like the meaning case 
above. In cases like this, intuitive claims that are serious trouble need not be more general and need 
not have any special inferential role.  
 The claim that some names are empty seems to be at least as general as the claim, which 
gives rise to Frege’s puzzle, that substituting co-referring proper names into identity statements can 
sometimes change the meanings of those statements: the second, but not the first, is restricted to a 
small subset of the sentences involving a particular collection of proper names. However, it is the 
second claim and not the first that is serious trouble for the Russellian account; the threat posed by 
the first claim merely invites further work. These claims are not treated equally, but their unequal 
treatment seems not to be explainable in terms of a centrality/periphery distinction like Quine’s.   
3. The Solution in Terms of Metaphysical Constraint 
In order to solve the puzzle of unequal treatment, I’ll need to articulate a notion that will be 
crucial to the adequate solution of the puzzle. The notion I will introduce is that of metaphysical 
constraint. 
 Metaphysical constraints are constitutive parts of the natures of their objects, so that a 
constraint on some x is just part of what it is to be x.11 If something is part of the nature of x, then it 
                                                
11 It is important to notice that natures are distinct from related notions like essences. Historically, terms like ‘nature’ and 
‘essence’ have been used interchangeably. However, ‘essence’ has recently acquired a particular technical meaning in light 
of influential work by Kit Fine (See e.g. Fine 1994). I take it (though I will not argue this point here) that we have some 
intuitive concept of nature, independent of the technical notion of essence, that is not naturally understood in Finean 
terms. This, and not identifying Finean essences, is what partisans in the debates I discuss take themselves to be 
	 14 
must obtain in every possible world in which x exists. So metaphysical constraints deserve their 
names because they constrain the behavior of their objects, placing limits on the way these objects 
can be instantiated across possible worlds. Though there are many ways that x might be, and so 
many possible worlds that differ from one another with respect to x, all of these worlds are ones in 
which x has the nature that it does and so are invariant with respect to the metaphysical constraints 
on x.12  
Because metaphysical constraints are constitutive parts of natures, they require no additional 
ontological commitment: they are no additions of being over and above natures. However, this 
doesn’t mean that constraints add nothing to what was already provided by natures. My claim is that 
the notion of metaphysical constraint ought to be adopted as a new piece of ideology in our best 
theory of the world. Metaphysical constraints provide a new way of thinking about a part of the 
world, natures, that (or so I aim to show) extends our understanding of metaphysics and secures 
significant methodological advantages as a result.  
 Metaphysical constraints are not conceptual truths or platitudes, though constraints often 
have conceptual or linguistic shadows that serve as guides to their existence. The constraints on x 
are constitutive parts of the nature of x, while platitudes and conceptual truths concern the ‘x’ 
concept. While there is rarely intelligible debate about platitudes or conceptual truths, debate about 
constraints is widespread.13 Constraints are also distinct from metaphysically necessary truths. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
uncovering. By discovering the nature of x, we’re discovering what it is to be x and so giving an account of what x is. 
Unlike Finean essences, natures are not propositional and need not be understood as real definitions of their objects.  
 
12 Throughout this paper, I assume a thick notion of necessity according to which modal facts are made true by some 
(perhaps fundamental) feature of the world rather than by facts about our concepts. It is worth noting that a thin notion 
of necessity is also available according to which modal facts are made true by semantic features of our concepts. Though 
metaphysical constraints are compatible with a thin notion of modality, the resulting view is significantly different from, 
and I think less attractive than, the view I defend. Constraints, on this view, identify features of some x that must be 
satisfied by any possible referent of the ‘x’ concept in virtue of being such a referent. 
 
13 In addition, metaphysical constraints, but not conceptual resources, can provide explanations by constraint and so 
have a centrally important role to play in metaphysical explanation. These explanations work from the top down, 
explaining why an event occurred or an object has a property by showing that it is required by a metaphysical constraint 
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constraints on x are metaphysically necessary because they are constitutive parts of the nature of x, 
but this is not the case for all metaphysically necessary truths concerning x. It is metaphysically 
necessary that x is worldmates with the fact that 1+1=2, for example, but this is not a metaphysical 
constraint on x.  
Finally, metaphysical constraints are similar to, but distinct from essential properties. 
Metaphysical constraints are not essential properties because they are not properties at all; they are 
states of affairs. For instance, having 3 sides is an essential property of triangles but it is not a 
metaphysical constraint on triangularity. In contrast, that triangles have 3 sides is a metaphysical 
constraint on triangularity but is not an essential property. This difference is important because 
states of affairs are more fine-grained than properties. The very same property can be had by a 
variety of objects and might be instantiated or uninstantiated in a world. States of affairs require that 
properties be instantiated in the particular objects that constitute them.   
Having explained what metaphysical constraints are, how can we appeal to them to solve the 
puzzle of unequal treatment? Here is my claim: intuitive threats that cause serious trouble for a view 
are just those that involve inconsistent commitments concerning metaphysical constraints. In 
contrast, intuitive threats that are mere invitations for further work do not involve this clash of 
putative constraints. While more work must be done, these intuitive threats are unlike the others 
because they need not betray a misunderstanding of the natures of the entities involved.  
Intuitive claims about metaphysical constraints are central to our understanding of their 
targets. But their centrality is of a paradigmatically metaphysical kind and is not a function of their 
generality or inferential relationships. Some intuitions are more central than others, on this way of 
understanding centrality, because some intuitions are about metaphysical constraints while others are 
                                                                                                                                                       
and so must have occurred or have the property it does. Unfortunately, further discussion of this role falls outside the 
scope of this paper (see Chapter 2 for more on this).	
 
	 16 
not. A solution to the puzzle of unequal treatment in terms of metaphysical constraints is a solution 
in terms of centrality, like the one considered in the previous section, but it is one that rejects the 
Quinean spirit of that suggestion. Unlike the Quinean account, metaphysical constraints provide a 
clear way of understanding the centrality at issue.  
 To see how metaphysical constraints solve the puzzle of unequal treatment, consider again 
the puzzle as it arises for the view that counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation. Among 
the intuitive threats to this view, some are serious trouble while others are merely invitations for 
further work. According to the solution I have proposed, these threats are treated unequally because 
the former involve a clash of constraints while the latter do not. 
Preemption cases are invitations for further work because the relationship between causation 
and counterfactual dependence is plausibly a metaphysical constraint on causation whereas our 
judgments about preemption cases are not plausibly metaphysical constraints. In contrast, 
intrinsicness and counterfactual dependence are both plausible constraints on causation but these 
constraints clash by being incompatible with one another.  
The relationship between causation and counterfactual dependence is plausibly a 
metaphysical constraint on the causal relation because the right sort of counterfactual dependence 
captures the precise way in which causes make a difference to their effects, and so the way in which 
effects depend on their causes. It is part of the nature of the causal relation to make a difference in 
this way, and so it is a constraint on the causal relation that it make a difference in this way.  Because 
constraints are constitutive parts of the natures of their objects, our representations of them 
function as relatively fixed points in our theories. Giving up a metaphysical constraint amounts to 
discovering that we were wrong all along about the nature of the entity under consideration:  our 
theory was very much on the wrong track.  
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As a result, it seems to follow from a plausible principle of conservatism that we ought to 
preserve the constraints whenever possible, making reasonable changes to other parts of our theory 
in order to do so. In other words, we ought not make dramatic revisions to our understanding of an 
entity when minor ones will do. Though our beliefs about metaphysical constraints are not self-
evident or indefeasible, their revision comes at a very high cost.  
By modifying rather than rejecting the counterfactual dependence constraint so as to 
accommodate preemption cases, we are attempting to make these minor changes in order to 
preserve our understanding of the nature of causation. In this spirit, friends of the counterfactual 
dependence constraint attempt to modify their understanding of it so as to be sensitive to the 
difference between genuine causes and preempted backups (Paul and Hall 2013). One way this 
might be done is by offering a more sensitive relation of counterfactual dependence (cf. Yablo 
2002). Another is by offering a new account of the relationship between causation and 
counterfactual dependence (cf. Lewis 2000). 
The conflict between intrinsicness and counterfactual dependence is serious trouble, by 
contrast, because it is the result of the clash between two plausible constraints on the causal relation. 
While the counterfactual dependence constraint plausibly captures the way in which causes make a 
difference to their effects, the intrinsicness constraint captures the conditions under which two 
causal processes count as the same so that intrinsic duplicates have identical causal structures. These 
constraints are plausibly both constitutive parts of the nature of causation and, by discovering that 
they are incompatible, we are discovering a deep confusion about what it is to be the causal relation. 
Cases involving the clash of constraints are, as Lewis put it, “bad trouble” because they show that 
we are mistaken about the natures at issue. 
 Similarly, consider the puzzle as it arises for the Russellian account of meaning. The threat 
posed by our intuitions about empty names invites more work for the Russellian account while 
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Frege’s puzzle is serious trouble for the view. These threats are not treated equally, I claim, because 
the second threat but not the first involves a clash of constraints. 
The intuitive threat posed by empty names is an invitation for further work because the 
central thesis of the Russellian account, that what it is for a word to have meaning is for it to refer to 
an object, is plausibly a metaphysical constraint on meaning whereas our intuitions about empty 
names are not plausibly metaphysical constraints. The central thesis of the Russellian account 
plausibly represents a metaphysical constraint on meaning because it characterizes the distinctive 
relationship between word and object that is constitutive of meaning. On the Russellian view, 
reference is taken to be the whole of what it is for words to have meanings and so to exhaust the 
nature of meaningfulness. Giving up this metaphysical constraint amounts to discovering that we 
were wrong all along about the nature of meaning so that our theory was very much on the wrong 
track.  
It seems, again, to follow from a plausible principle of conservatism that we ought to 
preserve the constraints whenever possible, making reasonable changes to other parts of our theory 
in order to do so. By modifying rather than rejecting the reference constraint, we are attempting to 
make these minor changes in order to preserve our understanding of the nature of meaning. In this 
spirit, friends of the Russellian view attempt to modify their understanding of it so as to 
accommodate empty names or to explain them away. One way this might be done is by denying the 
intuition that empty names have meaning (cf. Braun 1993, 2005). Another is by positing special non-
existent or fictional objects to which they refer (cf. Braun 2005 and Caplan 2004). 
The conflict between reference and intersubstitutability is serious trouble, by contrast, 
because it is the result of the clash between two plausible (by the lights of the Russellian view) 
constraints on meaning. While the reference constraint plausibly captures the relationship between 
word and object that is constitutive of meaning, the intersubstitutability constraint plausibly captures 
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the conditions under which two words count as having the same meaning. These constraints are 
plausibly both constitutive parts of the nature of meaning and, by discovering that they are 
incompatible, we are discovering a deep confusion about what it is for a word to have meaning. In 
the face of this deep confusion, radical revision of the Russellian theory of meaning is warranted.  
4. Some Examples of Metaphysical Constraint 
 The solution that metaphysical constraints provide to the puzzle of unequal treatment is 
indicative of a more general methodological role for metaphysical constraints. In the remainder of 
this paper, I will show how metaphysical constraints serve to underwrite a widespread method of 
contemporary metaphysics according to which theories are developed via the exploration of possible 
worlds.14 While we’ve had the procedure underlying this method mostly right, we have failed to 
appreciate what underwrites it and so have failed to understand why it works in the way that it does. 
The puzzle of unequal treatment emerges as a result of this failure and illustrates that, by attending 
to the metaphysical constraints that underwrite them, we can explain otherwise puzzling features of 
the debates that proceed by this method.  
  In order to see how metaphysical constraints underwrite the methodology of metaphysics, 
and to demonstrate their abundance, it will help to have some illuminating examples of metaphysical 
constraint before us. For one such example, consider the relationship between free will and the 
power to do otherwise. The idea that free will requires the power to do otherwise has a great deal of 
intuitive force and is often enshrined in the Principal of Alternate Possibilities (AP), which states 
that a person acted freely, and so is morally responsible for an action, only if she could have done 
otherwise.  
 A plausible way of understanding the tight relationship enshrined in AP is to understand it as 
a constraint on free will and so as a constitutive part of its nature. Part of what it is for a person to 
                                                
14 Kripkean worries about the idea of exploring possible worlds are unfounded. Possible worlds are explored by 
evaluating counterfactual conditionals rather than, as in Kripke’s 1980 discussion, via telescope.  
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act freely, on this view, is for her to have the power to do otherwise. Although there are many 
different ways in which free will can be exercised, and so many possible worlds that differ with 
respect to free will, these worlds cannot differ with respect to the power to do otherwise.  
 For a very different example, consider the uniqueness of composition, which (if true) is 
plausibly a metaphysical constraint on the composition relation. Composition is unique if it is the 
case that, for any composite objects x and y that have exactly the same proper parts, x is identical to 
y (see Lewis 1991, 74 as well as Varzi 2008, Simons 1987, and Sider 2007). That composition is 
unique is a constitutive part of the nature of the composition relation. Uniqueness partially 
constitutes the distinctive relationship between parts and wholes by identifying the conditions under 
which two composite objects are identical: they are identical if and only if they share exactly the 
same proper parts. This means that any way that wholes can be different from one another must be 
accompanied by a difference in their parts.  
 That composition is unique implies that the relationship between parts and wholes is an 
extensional one so that there is exactly one whole corresponding to each collection of parts. 
Together uniqueness and extensionality require a one-to-one correspondence between collections of 
parts and their wholes and this suggests a very tight connection between them. This very tight 
connection is responsible for the purported innocence of mereology: the idea that wholes are so 
closely related to the pluralities of their parts that they are ontologically thin and, in some sense, are 
nothing over and above them. Although there are many ways that the composition relation can be 
instantiated, and so many different possible worlds that differ composition-wise from one another, 
composition must be unique in every one of these worlds.  
Finally, consider the Principal Principle. The Principal Principle says (roughly) that a rational 
credence function should have the following structure. The credence it assigns to any proposition A, 
conditional on the proposition that the objective chance, at some time t, of A’s holding is x, should 
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also be x (provided that we have no inadmissible information). 15 It is part of what it takes for a 
credence function to be rational that the credences it recommends are determined by our credences 
about objective chances. So, we are often able to explain why particular credences are rational by 
appealing to our beliefs about objective chance. In this way, the Principal Principle identifies a kind 
of epistemic restriction: it identifies a connection between kinds of beliefs so that one kind ought 
rationally to determine another.  
 However, the Principal Principle also identifies a metaphysical constraint on objective chance. 
Part of what it is to be objective chance is to be a kind of “objective magnitude found in nature such 
that if you can only find out what its values are, you should use that knowledge to guide your 
expectations” (Roberts 2013, 34). So, the Principal Principle represents a constitutive part of the 
nature of objective chance (or the chance role) such that there is no possible world in which 
objective chances exist and yet fail to be the sorts of things which, once known, ought to guide 
rationally formed credences. This explains why the epistemic restriction holds and allows us to infer 
and perhaps to explain other important features that objective chances must have, for example, that 
objective chances must be related to one another in accordance with the axioms of the probability 
calculus. It is because it represents a metaphysical constraint on objective chance, in addition to an 
epistemic restriction on rational credence, that the Principal Principle captures and explains our 
intuitions about what it would be rational to believe in cases where we have information about 
objective chances. 
 
                                                
15 More precisely, let C be any reasonable initial credence function, t be any time, x be any real number between 0 and 1, 
and X be the proposition that the chance, at t, of A’s holding equals x. Finally, let E be any proposition compatible with 
X that is admissible at time t. The Principal Principle states that C(A/XE) = x. For a defense of the Principal Principle, 
see Lewis 1986d. For helpful discussion of it, see Briggs 2010, Hall 2004a, and Schaffer 2003. A revised version of the 
Principal Principle is also available and is intended to reconcile the Principal Principle with Lewis’ claim that chances 
supervene on the Humean mosaic (the Principal Principle and Humean supervience result in a contradiction, which is 
much discussed as the Big bad bug). See Lewis 1986e and Briggs 2009. I set this revised principle aside for simplicity and 
I don’t think that the differences between these principles affect my underlying point. 
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5. Constraints Underwrite the Method of Metaphysics 
 On a widely accepted method of contemporary metaphysics, theories are developed via the 
exploration of possible worlds. Promising claims are Identified, Precisified, and then Assessed by testing 
them against possible worlds that serve as apparent counterexamples. I will show that this IPA 
method is underwritten by metaphysical constraints like those enumerated in the preceding section.  
The IPA method, applied to some entity x, begins with identification. It requires us to identify, 
from among our beliefs about x, a rough, defeasible, and not very precise grasp of some candidate 
metaphysical constraint on x, perhaps obtained by inferring the existence of that constraint on the 
basis of an intuitive principle or platitude concerning x.16 The theory of x can then be developed by 
deepening our grasp of this metaphysical constraint, and so by deepening our understanding of x’s 
nature. This is the precisification step. It consists of refining our grasp of the candidate constraint on x 
into a suitable working hypothesis so as to understand what a world must be like in order to satisfy 
the constraint. One way in which metaphysical constraints underwrite the method of metaphysics is 
by providing fruitful working hypotheses. Once precisified, our grasp ought to allow us to 
determine, for any world under consideration, whether there is some part of that world that satisfies 
the constraint.17 The domain to which the constraint applies, as well as any enabling conditions that 
might also need to be met, must also be identified. 
A precise understanding of the constraint in hand, the final assessment step requires that we 
develop the theory of x by using this understanding to drive our exploration of possible worlds. 
Possible worlds like these serve as a laboratory in which our grasp of the nature of x can be tested. 
                                                
16 Or perhaps not. I will not defend any view about how we come by our loose and imprecise grasp of the constraints. I 
don’t think that this is a special problem for my view. Instead I think it is an instance of the more general and extremely 
difficult problem of giving an epistemology of metaphysics.  
 
17 As I understand it, a world satisfied a constraint if there is some part of that world that instantiates the constraint. 
Constraints are not satisfied in worlds in which they are vacuously true.    	
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Surveying the class of possible worlds (or intersection of worlds) that satisfy a constraint on x helps 
to reveal the range of variation that x can tolerate, showing how it might have been different as well 
as what features it must have across the possible worlds in which it exists. Exploring this class of 
worlds also helps to reveal the existence of additional constraints on x and so reveals ways in which 
a theory of x ought to be deepened and improved. Some of these worlds will contain possibilia that 
instantiate the constraint, and so partially overlap the nature of x, and yet fail to be x nonetheless. 
Additional constraints on x can be discovered, in these cases, by grasping what it is that distinguishes 
these possibilia from the x’s. 
 The theory of x can be further developed by testing it against possible worlds in which the 
constraint is not satisfied. Some of these worlds provide additional confirmation for the theory by 
bearing out its prediction that x will not be found in worlds in which a constraint on it is not 
satisfied. The theory can explain why x is not found in these worlds in terms of their failure to satisfy 
this constraint. Other worlds challenge our grasp of the constraint on x, and so our theory of x, by 
serving as apparent cases in which x exists but fails to satisfy the constraint. When our grasp survives 
these challenges, it is further confirmed. We also advance our understanding of the difficult cases 
constituted by these worlds by seeing how they must be understood in light of the constraints. In 
contrast, the failure to survive one of these challenges reveals a mistake in our understanding and, if 
we are lucky, ways in which our understanding of the constraint, and so our understanding of the 
nature of x, should be modified.   
 Though I have separated the steps of the IPA method for clarity, it is common in practice 
for us to perform the precisification and assessment steps at the same time: both refining our grasp of a 
constraint and testing it against possible worlds. If candidate ways of understanding a constraint are 
hypotheses to be tested in the laboratory provided by possible worlds, then exploring these worlds is 
a useful way of generating testable hypotheses as well as testing them. While the IPA method in 
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some ways resembles the old ‘proposal and counterexample’ method of traditional conceptual 
analysis, its aim is to provide a theory of some target entity, and so explain what it is to be that entity, 
rather than an analysis of any part of our conceptual scheme. Its end result is a precise grasp of the 
nature of the entity under consideration together with an understanding of the range of variation 
with which that nature is compatible. The IPA method is an effective way of developing 
metaphysical theories in part because it is an effective way of understanding the metaphysical 
constraints that underlie them. 
Because metaphysical constraints underwrite the IPA method for metaphysics, discovering 
the constraints on some x is a central part of developing a metaphysical theory of x. But the 
constraints on x might be central for different reasons depending on the shape that a theory of x 
might take. In some cases, discovering the constraints is central because, by doing this, we uncover 
the resources for giving necessary and sufficient conditions or because constraints establish the 
foundation for a reductive analysis. For a theory that aims to provide such an analysis, discovering 
the constraints on x is important as a means to this end. However, the constraints on x need not 
contribute to the theory of x in this way and are not only important when they lead to a broader 
reductive analysis. In many cases, a reductive analysis is not possible. This is true, for example, when 
x is fundamental or when the nature of x is infinitary or is constituted by an interrelated circle of 
entities. Instead, grasping the constraints on x is a worthy end in itself so that a theory of x can be 
successful just by uncovering the metaphysical constraints on x. By uncovering the constraints on x, 
the theory of x provides an informative account of what it is to be x and of how x must be. In doing 
this, it substantially extends our understanding of x and explains many of its features. 
6. Free Will: A Case Study 
To see metaphysical constraints in action, let’s consider again the debate about free will and 
the power to do otherwise. In section 3, I claimed that a plausible way of understanding the tight 
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relationship between free will and the power to do otherwise is to understand that relationship as a 
metaphysical constraint on free will and so as partially constituting its nature. The debate about free 
will and alternate possibilities is underwritten by metaphysical constraints and proceeds via the IPA 
method described in the previous section.  
The debate about free will and alternate possibilities begins with the identification of a rough 
but intuitive grasp of the alternate possibilities constraint, codified by the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities (AP). AP states that a person acted freely, and so is morally responsible for an action, 
only if she could have done otherwise than she did. In order to advance our understanding of the 
nature of free will, the IPA method requires that this intuitive grasp be precisified with the aim of 
understanding just what a world must be like in order to satisfy it. Deepening our grasp of this 
constraint is precisely what is at issue along a major front of the free will debate. This part of the 
debate concerns what must be the case when an agent ‘could have done otherwise’ and, in particular, 
whether having this power is compatible with causal determinism. Different ways of making AP 
precise are significant over and above their role in the debate about free will and determinism. They 
constitute rival proposals concerning the nature of free will.  
On one way of making AP precise, for example, an agent could have done otherwise with 
respect to an action A at a time t if and only if there is a possible world perfectly resembling the 
actual world up until t but diverging after t such that the agent (or her counterpart) does B instead of 
A. Because the laws and past states of the world prior to t are the same in each of these worlds, they 
are fully consistent with the agent’s doing either A or B (van Inwagen 2011). On another way of 
making AP precise, an agent could have done otherwise if and only if, had she chosen to do 
otherwise then she would have done otherwise (Chisholm 1964, 26).  
These ways of making AP precise have different implications for the compatibility of free 
will and determinism. But more importantly, they are underwritten by different ways of 
	 26 
understanding the metaphysical constraints being represented by AP. The power to do otherwise 
described in the first principle is distinct from the power that is described in the second one. As a 
result, these principles represent different constraints on free will and so attribute different natures 
to it. Grasping the precise form of the alternate possibilities constraint, and so understanding what 
AP entails, amounts to grasping part of the nature of free will and so understanding what must be 
the case in any possible world in which agents exercise it.  
Once a precise understanding of the alternate possibilities constraint is in hand, we move to 
the assessment step, using our understanding to drive our exploration of possible worlds in order to 
develop a theory of free will. These worlds serve as tests for our grasp of the nature of free will. One 
way our grasp can be tested is by exploring worlds that contain possibilia that satisfy the alternate 
possibilities constraint. These worlds contain agents who exercise their wills and have the power to 
do otherwise. Some of these worlds contain agents with free wills, and they help to reveal the range 
of variation exhibited by free will across the possible worlds in which it exists. Other worlds contain 
agents that have the power to do otherwise but nonetheless lack free will. These worlds reveal the 
existence of additional constraints on free will and so lead us to discover more of its nature.  
To see this, consider an indeterministic world in which Agent has a 50% chance of doing A 
and a 50% chance of doing B. In this world, choosing to perform an action does not make it any 
more likely to occur. Now suppose that Agent chooses to do A and, by chance, does B instead. 
Intuitively, she lacks free will but could have done otherwise than B. It was, after all, equally likely 
that she would have done A. Worlds like these suggest additional constraints on free will that are 
reflected by the intuition that free willings are up to us so that the free actions that occur as a result 
of them have their ultimate source in the agents that will them.18   
                                                
18 For examples of potential constraints that make good on this intuition, see Roderick Chisholm’s agent causal account 
and Robert Kane’s ultimacy condition (Chisholm 1967, Kane 1996). 
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Our theory of free will, and so our grasp of its nature, can be further assessed by testing it 
against possible worlds in which the alternate possibilities constraint is not satisfied. In some of 
these worlds, the circumstances that bring it about that agents will perform certain actions also make 
it impossible for these agents to avoid performing them. These worlds serve to confirm the theory. 
They often contain agents that are coerced, hypnotized or otherwise compelled to act and these 
agents bear out the theory’s prediction that they are paradigmatically un-free: they are un-free because 
they cannot do otherwise than they did and so fail to satisfy the alternate possibilities constraint on 
free will.  
Other worlds challenge our grasp of the alternate possibilities constraint, and so our theory 
of free will, by serving as apparent counterexamples. These worlds contain agents that lack the 
power to do otherwise but seem to have free wills nonetheless. One interesting example of this is 
provided by the set of so-called Frankfurt cases.19 In Frankfurt worlds, the circumstances are 
sufficient to bring it about that an agent will perform some action but do not cause the agent to act 
in that way. Agents in these worlds could not have done otherwise but they act for their own 
reasons nonetheless. 
Prima facie challenges like the Frankfurt cases prompt further development of our 
understanding of the alternate possibilities constraint, when it survives them, and advances our 
understanding of the cases as well. For example, we might locate hidden alternatives in Frankfurt 
cases, showing that the agents in them actually do have the power to do otherwise. Or, we might 
modify the range of cases in which the power to do otherwise is required and so adopt a more 
                                                
19 The case of Jones and Smith is a representative Frankfurt case. Suppose that Jones wants Smith to φ. He will do 
whatever is necessary to insure that Smith φ’s but will not show his hand unless it is necessary. So, he installs a 
counterfactual intervener in Smith’s brain without his knowledge. This devise has no effect whatsoever unless Smith begins 
to form the intention not to φ, in which case it hijacks Smith’s brain so as to make it the case that he decides to φ. No 
matter what Smith wants or intends, he will φ. But now suppose that Jones never needs to show his hand. Smith φ’s for 
his own reasons. Intuitively, Smith acted freely even though he could not have done otherwise. See Frankfurt 1969. 
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nuanced understanding of the alternate possibilities constraint.20 In contrast, the failure to survive 
one of these challenges reveals that the alternate possibilities constraint, as we have understood it, 
must be modified or abandoned altogether: this means that we have misunderstood the nature of 
free will. 
7. Metaphysical Debates are often Debates about Constraints 
 Because metaphysical constraints underwrite a widespread method of contemporary 
metaphysics, it is natural to understand familiar metaphysical debates as debates about metaphysical 
constraints. By understanding familiar debates in this way, we can explain how and why they go in 
the way that they do. To see this, let’s return to the debate about whether and how causation is 
related to counterfactual dependence, which I have claimed is plausibly a metaphysical constraint on 
the causal relation.  
One kind of debate concerning causation and counterfactual dependence concerns whether 
the relationship between them constitutes a genuine constraint on the causal relation. This debate is 
distinct from the one about whether an analysis of causation can be given in terms of counterfactual 
dependence; it is true in general that reductive analyses are not entailed by constraints. However, it is 
a debate that often pits proponents of the counterfactual analysis of causation against those who 
deny that counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation. According to these rivals, causation 
can occur in absence of counterfactual dependence and so the relationship between causation and 
counterfactual dependence is not part of the nature of the causal relation. Disagreement between 
proponents of these rival accounts is disagreement about what the constraints on causation are and, 
in particular, about whether the relationship between causation and counterfactual dependence is 
among them.  
                                                
20 See McKenna 2008 for a helpful overview of the dialectic and Franklin 2011 for further discussion. 
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Another kind of debate, the one between proponents of rival counterfactual dependence 
accounts, concerns how causation is related to counterfactual dependence and so concerns the 
precise way in which the counterfactual dependence constraint ought to be understood. Proponents 
of counterfactual dependence accounts agree on the rough defeasible, and imprecise form of the 
constraint but disagree about how best to develop their imprecise grasp and so disagree about what 
a world must be like in order to satisfy the constraint. The form of the counterfactual dependence 
constraint determines how these accounts can differ and so helps to explain why the debate 
proceeds in the way that it does. Competing accounts might differ either by proposing competing 
relations of counterfactual dependence, or by proposing competing relationships between 
counterfactual dependence and causation.  
The debate about how causation is related to counterfactual dependence proceeds via the 
IPA method described above. Rival counterfactual accounts, and so rival forms of the constraint, are 
suggested and then tested against counterexamples: intuitive cases of causation that are incompatible 
with the analysis. By evaluating these counterexamples, we explore possible worlds that test and 
prompt us to further develop our understanding of the counterfactual dependence constraint and so 
further develop the theory of causation.  
Preemption cases, like the case of Suzy and Billy illustrate this. They show that the right kind 
of counterfactual dependence, and so the right way to understand the counterfactual dependence 
constraint, will need to be sensitive enough to distinguish causal relations from the extrinsic noise 
added to a causal system by preempted causes. While it is an open question how best to do this, the 
shape of the counterfactual dependence constraint determines the strategies available just as it 
determined how competing counterfactual accounts of causation might differ: different strategies 
involve modifying different parts of the constraint. One strategy is to modify the relationship 
between causation and counterfactual dependence, as in Lewis’ (2000) influence account. On this 
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view, the relationship between causation and counterfactual dependence is one of covariation over 
sets of counterfactuals. The idea here is that effects are sensitive to a range of changes in their causes 
but are not sensitive in this way to extrinsic noise. Another strategy is to make changes to the kind 
of counterfactual dependence involved in the relationship, as in Stephen Yablo’s (2002) de facto 
dependence account. On this view, causation is related to de facto dependence where E de facto 
depends on C if, had C not occurred and had other suitably chosen factors been held fixed, E would 
not have occurred. The debate between instances of these strategies is a debate about how we ought 
to refine our understanding of the constraint in the face of possible worlds that contain preemption.  
Proponents of the counterfactual dependence account aim to provide a reductive analysis of 
causation. However, understanding the debate between rival accounts as a debate about 
metaphysical constraints suggests that a counterfactual dependence theory of causation can be 
successful even if the prospects for reducing causation to some form of counterfactual dependence 
is dim. Such a theory would be successful, even while failing to provide a reduction, because it 
uncovers the constraints on causation and so deepens our grasp of its nature.  
8. Conclusion  
Metaphysical constraints are a new notion in metaphysics that ought to be distinguished 
from related notions like conceptual truths, necessary truths, and essential properties. I’ve argued 
that metaphysical constraints serve to underwrite a widely accepted method of contemporary 
metaphysics according to which theories can be developed by exploring possible worlds. By 
identifying what underwrites it, I have filled an important hole in this familiar method and 
uncovered the resources for explaining why it is fruitful when it is.  
In doing this, I’ve helped to settle the question of which things are fixed points that structure 
metaphysical debates and which things are spoils to be rewarded to the victor of these debates. 
Settling this question yields an explanation for the puzzle of unequal treatment that I identify in 
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section 1: that, among intuitive threats to a view, some are serious trouble while others are mere 
invitations for further work. It also allows us to explain why and how familiar metaphysical debates, 
like the debate about causation and counterfactual dependence, proceed in the ways that they do. 
Which positions are available in these debates, as well as which strategies are available for addressing 













1. Introduction  
Why is it that Marc Zuckerberg is so wealthy? 
One response, setting aside the implicit (unintended!) criticism that such a question might imply, is 
to offer a familiar sort of causal explanation of Zuckerberg’s wealth. Such an explanation would 
work by providing information about the causal history or causal mechanism that gave rise to it: 
information, for example, about his invention of Facebook, his large financial stake in the company, 
and its historical value. 
 However, another response is available and has attracted a great deal of recent attention (cf. 
Raven 2011, Audi 2012, Fine 2012, Dasgupta 2014, Trogdon 2013, and Kment 2014). This response 
is to offer a distinctively metaphysical sort of explanation backed by or consisting in metaphysical 
grounding. In contrast with the causal explanation just offered, a grounding explanation of 
Zuckerberg’s wealth would try to explain what makes it the case that Zuckerberg counts as being 
wealthy in the first place, regardless of cause. Recognizing that being wealthy isn’t a primitive state 
of the world, this explanation works by providing information about the grounds of Zuckerberg’s 
wealth. Perhaps it is grounded, for example, in the fact that he constitutes a very small proportion of 
Earth’s total population while holding a very large proportion of its total wealth. 1 
                                                
1 For other examples, see Audi 2012 and Dasgupta 2014. 
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Because they have received so much attention in recent years, it might be tempting to 
conclude that all metaphysical explanations are grounding explanations. My aim, in what follows, is 
to show that this is not the case. 
With this goal in mind, I will identify and account for a before-now unrecognized form of 
metaphysical explanation. For reasons I’ll soon make clear, I call this kind of explanation metaphysical 
explanation by constraint.2 Metaphysical explanations by constraint are interesting for several reasons: 
they are instances of a new category of metaphysical explanation, they promise to extend our 
explanatory reach by underwriting novel explanations, and they illuminate an important connection 
between metaphysics and science. 
 Metaphysical explanations by constraint also reveal that contemporary work on metaphysical 
explanation is guilty of an important oversight. Worse, this oversight is not new to philosophy: it is 
analogous to one that has already been recognized and for the most part rectified in the philosophy 
of science. By making it themselves, metaphysicians are repeating past mistakes.  
Here is the kind of oversight I have in mind: nearly all of the attention spent on scientific 
explanation in the last thirty or forty years has been devoted to causal explanation: explanations that 
work by providing information about what causes what. In fact, some philosophers of science have 
even gone so far as to claim that all scientific explanations of particular events are causal (cf. Lewis 
1986b). But, while causal explanation is clearly important, an increasing amount of new work has 
shown that it is not alone (See Lange 2011, 2013, Baker 2005, and Skow 2014). Non-causal 
explanations abound in science but have nonetheless been overlooked by the causation-centric view. 
By focusing exclusively on causal explanations while overlooking non-causal ones, the causation-
centric view results in an impoverished understanding of scientific explanation.  
                                                
2 I owe the term ‘explanation by constraint’ to Marc Lange, though there are significant differences in our usage. For an 
account of explanation by constraint in science see Lange 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2014 and Forthcoming.  
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In much the same way, recent work on metaphysical explanation has concerned itself almost 
exclusively with grounding explanations: metaphysical explanations that work by providing 
information about what grounds what.3 In fact, some metaphysicians have gone so far as to claim 
that all metaphysical explanations are grounding explanations (cf. Trogdon 2013, 97). But, while 
grounding explanations are important, I’ll show that they are not alone: metaphysical explanations 
by constraint show that non-grounding explanations abound in metaphysics. By focusing nearly 
exclusively on grounding explanations while overlooking non-grounding ones, the grounding-centric 
view results in an impoverished understanding of the way in which a metaphysical explanation can 
be. This is especially important given that early enthusiasm for grounding has given way to some 
healthy skepticism about it (e.g. Daly 2012 and Wilson 2014). Skepticism about grounding need not 
entail skepticism about metaphysical explanation.   
2. The Top-down vs. Generative Explanation in Science 
 
To show that there is a place for metaphysical explanations by constraint and to see what 
grounding-centric views have overlooked, I’ll begin with the familiar distinction between top down 
and what we might call generative scientific explanation. I’ll show that this distinction ought to be 
extended to metaphysics as well. 
Intuitively, a scientific explanation counts as generative or bottom-up if it gets its 
explanatory power by describing the process by which its target was generated or produced. It explains 
why a particular event occurred or why some regularity is the case by showing what brought it about 
and so by showing how it fits into the world’s causal nexus.  
Paradigmatic examples of generative explanations are causal/mechanical: they get their 
explanatory power by identifying the underlying causal mechanisms by which their targets are 
                                                
3 Much work on metaphysical explanation gives the impression that metaphysical explanations are mostly or always 
grounding explanations (cf. Fine 2012, 40). Grounding is often identified with a distinctively metaphysical kind of 
explanation, as in Dasgupta 2014, 3 and it is sometimes explicitly claimed that all metaphysical explanations are 
grounding explanations (cf. Trogdon 2013, 97). Recent exceptions include Dasgupta 2014 and Kment 2014. 
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produced and so by providing information about the causal structure of the world. “To explain [in 
this way] is to expose the internal workings, to lay bare the hidden mechanisms, to open the black 
boxes nature presents to us” (Salmon, 2006 134). Salt dissolves in water, for example, because 
charged parts of water molecules pull charged chlorine ions off of salt crystals and into solution, 
causing the salt to dissolve. The pressure in a cylinder of gas increases when its volume is decreased 
because a smaller volume causes the gas molecules in random motion to collide with the walls of the 
cylinder more often (they don’t need to travel so far between collisions), and so exert a greater force 
on the walls. This increase in force exerted by the gas molecules is an increase in pressure.  
Perhaps other causal explanations of particular events are generative as well. Though they 
don’t identify internal workings or hidden mechanisms, they do work by identifying the chain of 
causes that produced our explanatory targets and so bring them about. The reason why the car 
crashed, to borrow an example from Lewis, was because the road was icy, the tires were bald, the 
driver was drunk, and was coming around a blind corner (1986b). Similarly, the reason that 
barometer readings fall whenever a storm is coming is because storms and falling barometer 
readings are both caused by falling atmospheric pressure. 
In contrast with generative explanations, top-down explanations work by subsuming their 
explananda under extremely general principles, showing how particular occurrences fit into the 
universal scheme of things. Top-down explanations don’t need to cite causes and, what is more 
important, don’t work by revealing the mechanisms that give rise to their targets. They are called top 
down because they motivate the idea that extremely general facts or unifying regularities are primary 
and that particular facts are explained from the top: by unifying them under general principles. 
Perhaps the best-known examples of top-down explanation involve explanation by 
unification (cf. Friedman 1974 and Kitcher 1989). But I’d like to focus on a particularly interesting 
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set of examples involving what has been called scientific explanation by constraint.4 These explanations 
explain why their targets are the case by showing that they must be the case: they are more necessary 
than can be accounted for by the causal or nomic structure of the world.  
Many of the clearest examples of scientific explanation by constraint involve conservation 
laws. Consider that, despite the many ways in which they are different, gravitational and electrical 
interactions both conserve energy. Why are they similar in this way? Drawing from Lange 2011, they 
are similar because they must be. The law of conservation of energy is more necessary than the force 
laws. It requires them, and every other nomologically possible interaction, to conserve energy. This 
is not a coincidental feature that all force laws happen to share. Rather, that they conserve energy is 
a constraint on the way any possible force law can be. 
For another example, imagine that we are playing a game of pool. You hit the 8-ball with the 
cue ball and the cue ball stops as the 8-ball sails off into the corner pocket. Why does the cue ball 
stop rather than continuing on its original path? It stops because it must. The law of conservation of 
momentum requires that the pool balls, and every other nomologically possible system, conserve 
momentum: in absence of external forces, the total momentum of the system must stay the same 
over time. In causing it to move, the cue ball has transferred its momentum to the 8-ball so that 
additional movement of the cue ball in absence of external intervention would require a 
spontaneous increase in momentum, violating the conservation law. All force laws conserve 
momentum but this is not merely a coincidental feature that all force laws happen to share. Rather, 
that they conserve momentum is a constraint on the way any possible force law can be. 
Importantly, some things can be explained both from the top-down and generatively, from 
the bottom-up. Consider Wesley Salmon’s famous case of the friendly physicists. In this case, the 
friendly physicist asks what a helium filled balloon in the cabin of an airplane will do when the plane 
                                                
4 This sort of explanation first appears in Lange 2011 along with the term ‘scientific explanation by constraint.  
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accelerates for takeoff. While we might have expected the balloon to move toward the back of the 
plane during acceleration it in fact moves toward the front instead. Why is this so? There are two 
explanations we might give. On the first, generative explanation, we might give causal information 
concerning the behavior of the air molecules in the cabin. The rear wall of the airplane collides with 
some of these molecules creating a pressure gradient so that there is more pressure behind the 
balloon than in front. This unbalanced force causes it to move toward the front of the plane. On the 
second, top-down explanation, we might cite Einstein’s principle of equivalence. This principle says 
that acceleration is physically equivalent to a gravitational field.5 Because helium balloons tend to rise 
in earth’s gravitational field, “they will move forward when the airplane accelerates, reacting just as 
they would if a gravitational field were suddenly placed behind the rear wall” (Salmon 2006, 183).  
The distinction between top-down and generative explanations is an important one in 
philosophy of science. But it is not unique to scientific explanation: the top down/generative 
distinction ought to be extended to metaphysical explanation as well. In fact, generative 
metaphysical explanations are already widely appreciated in the form of grounding explanations. 
Recall that generative scientific explanations work by uncovering causal mechanisms and so by 
describing the processes by which their targets are produced. In much the same way, grounding 
explanations work by uncovering hidden metaphysical mechanisms. They explain why something 
exists or has the features it does by identifying the metaphysical mechanisms that give rise to it: the 
more fundamental bits of the world in which it is grounded. For example, we explained what makes 
it the case that Zuckerberg counts as being wealthy, what it is in virtue of which Zuckerberg is 
wealthy, by citing the grounds for his being wealthy: Zuckerberg is wealthy in virtue of constituting a 
small percentage of Earth’s total population while possessing a large percentage of its total wealth.  
                                                
5 Physically equivalent systems are indistinguishable with respect to their physical processes so that the laws of nature 
with respect to one system entirely agree with the laws with respect to the other (Friedman 1983, 318). 
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This analogy between causal and metaphysical mechanisms is an apt one in virtue of the 
deep similarities shared by the causal relation and the grounding relation. Grounding is often glossed 
as the metaphysical analog of causation (Sider 2001, 145, Schaffer 2012, 112 and Schaffer 2014, 
Wilson 2014a) and is sometimes even identified with a species of causation (Bennett 2011, 93 -4). 
Grounding and causing are formally similar so that the same modeling techniques can be used to 
describe them.  
Lastly, both grounding and causing are relations of generation or production and each 
underwrites a kind of asymmetric dependence. Causes give rise to their effects so that effects depend 
on their causes. In an analogous way, more fundamental entities give rise to less fundamental ones 
by grounding them so that less fundamental entities depend on their grounds. It is because 
grounding and causation are similar in these ways that grounding explanations and 
causal/mechanical explanations are similar as well. Both work by describing the way in which their 
explananda were generated and so by revealing the underlying features on which they depend.  
Grounding explanations and causal explanations plausibly belong to different explanatory 
kinds: they have different sources of explanatory power. But there is also a deep similarity between 
them that is well captured by their common membership in the category of generative explanation.  
This deep similarity is suggestive. Causal explanations have a metaphysical analogue in the 
form of grounding explanations. Is there a metaphysical analogue to scientific explanation by 
constraint: a kind of metaphysical explanation that works from the top-down rather than 
generatively? No one has yet approached this question. But in what remains I will argue that the 





3. Some Metaphysical Explanations by Constraint 
The best way to introduce these metaphysical explanations by constraint is to begin with 
some examples of them. It is important to note, though, that I do not intend to endorse any of the 
controversial claims that appear in these examples. Instead, I’ll be setting aside questions about 
whether these claims are true in order to see how the explanations that feature them work supposing 
that they are genuine.  In doing this, I’m extending a common practice from philosophy of science. We 
can sensibly ask, for example, whether the Ptolemaic model of the solar system explains the motion 
of the planets even though we know full way that the Ptolemaic model is false. 
This important caveat in place, let’s consider the first example, called Candy Bar 
Candy Bar: Fred wants to buy a candy bar from the vending machine. It costs a 
dollar but all he has are two quarters and a penny. The fact that 25+25+1 does not 
equal 100 explains why it is that Fred fails every time he tries to add his two 
quarters and penny together to equal the dollar he needs to buy the candy bar 
(holding fixed their monetary values).  
 
Here is another example:  
Dishes: Imagine five dishes in a sink, one stacked on top of the other, and suppose 
that exactly these dishes taken together sum to form an object. Let’s call the resulting 
object a stack. The fact that composition is unique explains why it is that there are 
not two distinct stacks composed of exactly our five dishes.  
 
Composition is unique if it is the case that, for any composite objects x and y that have exactly the 
same proper parts, x is identical to y (see Lewis 1991, 74 as well as Varzi 2008, Simons 1987, and 
Sider 2007). This means that if exactly our five dishes were to compose two stacks, so that these 
stacks would have had exactly the same proper parts, then these stacks would have been identical 
and so could not have been distinct.  
Finally, consider the following explanation inspired by David Lewis (1983).  
Armstrongian Laws: That they would violate Hume’s Dictum explains why there are 
no Armstrongian laws of nature. 
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 On the Armstrongian account, lawful generalizations like ‘all electrons are negatively charged’ hold 
because there is a second order state of affairs: the second order lawmaking universal relates 
electron-hood and negative charge-ness. Laws of nature are identical to these second order states of 
affairs. While it is a contingent matter what universals the lawmaker relates, it is metaphysically 
necessary that if the lawmaker relates electron-hood and negative charge-ness and x is an electron, 
then x is negatively charged.  
There are no Armstrongian laws of nature (so the Lewisian argument goes), because 
Armstrongian laws violate Hume’s Dictum, which states that there are no necessary connections 
among distinct existences.6 The Armstrongian account requires these connections because it is 
metaphysically necessary that, if N relates electron-hood to negative charge-ness and x is an electron, 
then x is negatively charged. This is so even though being negatively charged is distinct from the 
complex universal produced by the conjunction of the lawmaking universal and it’s being the case 
that x is an electron. 
Like scientific explanations by constraint, these metaphysical explanations by constraint 
explain why something is (or isn’t) the case by showing that it must be the case. They work from the 
top down by showing how particular occurrences fit into the universal scheme of things. I’ll soon 
propose an account according to which metaphysical explanations by constraint get their power by 
showing that their targets result from what I call metaphysical constraints and so must necessarily be 
the case. 
Before presenting the details of my account, however, I’d like to provide some intuitive 
motivation for it by looking back over the examples. Let’s consider Candy Bar again. Why does Fred 
fail every time he tries to add two quarters and penny together to equal the dollar he needs? He fails 
                                                
6 There is a substantive question about what sort of distinctness matters for the application of Hume’s dictum (Wilson 
2010). It is also plausible, as Lewis notes, that states of affairs involving natural laws and their implications are not 
perfectly distinct. However, Lewis claims that they are distinct enough for Hume’s dictum to apply (Lewis 1983). 
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because (holding fixed the value of quarters, pennies, and dollars) success is impossible. Success is 
mathematically impossible because twenty-five, twenty-five and one can’t be summed to one 
hundred. But, on a plausible assumption about the nature of mathematical functions, it is also 
metaphysically impossible. It is plausible that the natures of mathematical functions are constituted 
by the distinctive argument value mappings that they impose. What it is to be the addition function 
is to map arguments to values in a characteristic way. So it is a constitutive part of the nature of 
addition to be such that its operation on twenty-five, twenty-five and one yields fifty-one. Fred fails 
because he must. His failure is not just mathematically necessary; it results from the very nature of 
addition itself.  
In the same way, the dishes fail to compose two distinct stacks because, if uniqueness is true, 
then success is metaphysically impossible. Uniqueness is plausibly a constitutive part of the nature of 
composition and so plausibly serves as a metaphysical constraint on it. Uniqueness is constitutive of 
the distinctive relationship between parts and wholes, it underwrites the extensionality of parthood 
and this, in turn motives its purported ontological innocence: the idea that wholes are in some sense 
nothing over and above their parts and so are no additions to being.7  
Similarly, there are no Armstrongian laws of nature because there can’t be: Armstrongian 
laws are metaphysical impossibilities. They violate Hume’s dictum, which serves as a constraint on 
metaphysical modality and so is a constitutive part of the nature of possibility.  
Hume’s dictum serves as a constraint on metaphysical modality by placing a limit on what 
sorts of necessary connections there can be, ruling out those that hold between distinct entities. It 
underwrites a combinatorial picture of modality according to which part of what it is for something 
                                                
7 Uniqueness identifies the conditions under which two composite objects are identical: they are identical if and only if 
they share exactly the same proper parts. By settling the identity conditions for composite objects, uniqueness helps to 
identify the distinctive relationship between parts and wholes, implying an extensional relationship between them. This 
very tight connection is responsible for the purported innocence of mereology: the idea that wholes are so closely related 
to the pluralities of their parts that they are ontologically thin and, in some sense, are nothing over and above them. 
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to be metaphysically possible is for it to be the product of the free recombination of distinct 
existences. 
4. An Account of Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint 
With these examples in hand, it’s time to present my account of metaphysical explanation by 
constraint in more detail. Here is my view: metaphysical explanations by constraint are characterized 
by the source of their explanatory power: they work by showing that their explananda result from a 
metaphysical constraint so that they must, of metaphysical necessity, be the case. 
Metaphysical constraints, on my view, are constitutive parts of the natures of their objects so 
that a constraint on some x is just part of what it is to be x.8 If something is part of the nature of x, 
then it must obtain in every possible world in which x exists. Though worlds might differ in many 
ways with respect to x, they can’t possibly differ with respect to the constraints on x.  
Because metaphysical constraints are constitutive parts of natures, they require no additional 
ontological commitment: they are no additions of being over and above natures. However, this 
doesn’t mean that constraints add nothing to what was already provided by natures. Rather, I claim 
here and elsewhere that metaphysical constraints ought to be adopted as new pieces of the ideology 
of our best theory (See Chapters 1 and 3). Metaphysical constraints provide a new way of thinking 
about a part of the world, natures, that extends our understanding of metaphysics and the nature of 
explanation. 
Metaphysical constraints should not be confused with conceptual truths or platitudes, 
though constraints often have conceptual or linguistic shadows. The constraints on x are 
constitutive parts of the nature of x, while platitudes and conceptual truths concern the ‘x’ concept. 
                                                
8 It is important to notice that natures are distinct from related notions like essences. Historically, these terms have been 
used interchangeably. However, ‘essence’ has recently acquired a particular technical meaning in light of influential work 
by Kit Fine (See e.g. Fine 1994). I take it (though I will not argue this point here) that we have some intuitive concept of 
nature, independent of the technical notion of essence, that is not naturally understood in Finean terms. This, and not 
Finean essences, is what partisans in the debates I discuss take themselves to be uncovering. By discovering the nature of 
x, we’re discovering what it is to be x and so giving an account of what x is. Unlike Finean essences, natures are not 
propositional and need not be understood as real definitions of their objects.  
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While there is rarely intelligible debate about platitudes or conceptual truths, debate about 
constraints is widespread.  
Metaphysical constraints are also distinct from metaphysically necessary truths. The 
constraints on x are metaphysically necessary because they are constitutive part of the nature of x, 
but this is not the case for all metaphysically necessary truths concerning x. It is metaphysically 
necessary that x is worldmates with the fact that 1+1=2, for example, but that’s not a metaphysical 
constraint on x.  
Finally, metaphysical constraints are similar to, but distinct from, essential properties. 
Metaphysical constraints are not essential properties because they are not properties at all; they are 
states of affairs. This might seem like a small point, but the difference is important because states of 
affairs are more fine-grained than properties. The very same property can be had by a variety of 
objects and might be instantiated or uninstantiated in a world. In contrast, states of affairs require 
that properties be instantiated in the particular objects that constitute them. 
On my account, Metaphysical explanations by constraint get their explanatory power by 
showing their explananda to result from a metaphysical constraint. Some fact results from a 
constraint if, had that fact not obtained, a state of affairs that is inconsistent with the constraint 
might have (impossibly) obtained instead.  
One way in which a state of affairs might be inconsistent with a constraint is for it to be 
logically inconsistent with it. A world in which composition is unique but which also features 
distinct composite objects that share exactly the same proper parts is a world like this. Another way 
in which a state of affairs might be inconsistent with a constraint is for it to be metaphysically 
inconsistent with it. A world in which there is some one thing that is crimson but not red is a world 
that is metaphysically inconsistent in this way. Because they result from constraints, the explananda 
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of metaphysical explanations by constraint are metaphysically necessary. They cannot be other than 
they are on pain of making it the case that an impossible state of affairs might obtain. 
Fred fails every time he tries to add his two quarters and penny together to equal the dollar 
he needs (holding monetary values fixed) because he must fail. His failure results from a 
metaphysical constraint on addition: the characteristic mapping of 25, 25, and 1 to 51 that is 
plausibly a constitutive part of the nature of divisibility. A world in which Fred succeeded in adding 
his two quarters and penny together to equal the dollar (holding fixed their values) is a world in 
which, per impossible, addition fails to have its nature. This explanation works from the top down 
because it explains why Fred always fails by showing his failure to result from a much more general 
fact: a metaphysical constraint. It has the effect of unifying Fred’s failures with an enormous range 
of other failures, both possible and actual, to get 100 by adding 25, 25, and 1 and it shows how the 
particular occurrences of his failures fit into the broader scheme of things.  
Similarly, exactly our five dishes fail to compose more than one distinct stack because they 
must. Their failure results from a metaphysical constraint on the composition relation: the 
uniqueness of composition, which is plausibly a constitutive part of the nature of composition. Had 
the dishes composed more than one distinct stack, the composition relation would have, per 
impossible, had a different nature than it actually does. Like Candy Bar, the explanation in Dishes 
works from the top down. It explains why the dishes actually fail by showing it to result from a 
much more general metaphysical constraint. In doing so, it has the effect of unifying the failure of 
the dishes with an enormous range of other failures of other collections of parts to compose more 
than one distinct whole.  
Finally, There are no Armstrongian laws because there can’t possibly be. Their absence 
results from a constraint on metaphysical possibility itself: Hume’s dictum, which is plausibly a 
constitutive part of the nature of metaphysical possibility. Had there been Armstrongian laws, there 
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would have been necessary connections among distinct existences so that a state of affairs 
inconsistent with the nature of metaphysical possibility might have obtained. Like Candy Bar and 
Dishes, the explanation in Armstrongian laws works from the top down by showing how a range of 
particular failures result from a more general metaphysical constraint and so by unifying these 
failures with all the other failures, in other possible worlds, of laws to be Armstrongian.  
Explanations by constraint are distinguished from other metaphysical explanations by the 
source of their explanatory power and, importantly, not by the kinds of facts that they contain. 9 For 
example including a constraint in the explanans is not enough to make for an explanation by 
constraint. The fact that composition is unique explains why it is that composition is unique or blue. 
But that’s not an explanation by constraint: composition is unique or blue in virtue of being unique so 
that this is a grounding explanation (I’ll argue that these are distinct soon). It is not important, in 
order for this explanation to go through, that uniqueness is a constraint on composition. What 
matters is that it is sufficient to ground the fact that composition is unique or blue.  
Similarly, explanations by constraint are not distinguished by their failure to include other 
kinds of facts, like facts about grounding or causal structure. Explanations by constraint often do 
include these facts but retain their distinct source of explanatory power nonetheless.  
Grounding facts, like the fact that the dishes compose a stack, and facts about causes, like the 
fact that Fred has two quarters and a penny, make it the case that an explanandum falls under the 
purview of a metaphysical constraint and so must be the case. It isn’t true, though, that Fred fails to 
add his two quarters and a penny to get a dollar, or that the dishes fail to compose more than one 
stack, because of these facts. Facts about grounding and causing are not contributing any explanatory 
power here. They belong to the body of facts that are presupposed by the explanation seeking 
                                                
9 This is parallel to Lange’s 2013 claim that distinctively mathematical explanations of scientific facts are distinguished 
from other explanations by the source of their explanatory power. It seems to me that this is a reasonable general way to 
distinguish kinds of explanations.  
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questions in Candy Bar and Dishes and so function as a part of the background against which an 
explanation is sought. They do not enter into the explanantia. 
5. Explanations by Constraint are not Grounding Explanations 
In the preceding sections, I identified a kind of metaphysical explanation that I call 
metaphysical explanation by constraint. In addition to providing some examples of this sort of 
explanation, I’ve offered an account of them according to which they work by showing their 
explananda to result from a metaphysical constraint. Unlike grounding explanations, I’ve suggested 
that metaphysical explanations by constraint work from the top down and are not generative 
explanations.  
It’s time now to show that metaphysical explanations are distinct from grounding 
explanations and so are instances of a genuinely new kind of explanation that cannot be understood 
in terms of grounding. I’ll argue that they are distinct along two different dimensions: they have 
difference sources of explanatory power and belong to different explanatory categories. I conclude 
that metaphysical explanations by constraint are a novel kind of metaphysical explanation that is 
ignored by the grounding-centric view. Because it ignores non-grounding explanations like these, the 
grounding-centric view impoverishes our understanding of metaphysical explanation.  
In order to see how metaphysical explanations by constraint are different from grounding 
explanations, it will be helpful to look at a case that can be explained in both ways. Let’s consider 
Candy Bar again but, this time, let’s simplify things by modifying the explanandum so that it concerns 
a particular failure rather than a generalization. I do this to make the grounding explanation easier to 
provide. However, it is interesting to note that modified Candy Bar is a case in which a particular event 
is explained by metaphysical constraint. This calls into question the orthodox view that particular 
events can only receive causal explanations.  
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Modified Candy Bar: Why did Fred fail when he tried a moment ago to add his two 
quarters and penny together to equal the dollar he needs to buy a candy bar (holding 
monetary values fixed)?  
 
One (purported) way of explaining why Fred failed is to describe the causal mechanism that resulted 
in his failure and so to provide a causal explanation of it. 10 Perhaps he failed because he added the 
quarter, and then the penny, and then the quarter and this method resulted in fifty-one cents rather 
than 100 cents.  
In addition to this (purported) causal explanation, there is also a (purported as we’ll see) 
grounding explanation for Fred’s failure. This kind of metaphysical explanation tries to say what 
features of his attempt to add his change to make a dollar made it count as a failure in the first place: 
what is it in virtue of which Fred’s attempt counted as a failure.  
By identifying these features, the grounding explanation for Fred’s failure provides 
information about the way in which his failure is grounded by features of his attempt. For example, 
Fred’s failure might be grounded in the difference between the state of affairs that Fred intended to 
bring about and the state of affairs that he in fact brought about so that it is in virtue of this 
difference that Fred’s attempt counts as a failure. That the result he intended is not the result he 
achieved explains why it is that Fred failed a moment ago to add his two quarters and penny 
together to equal a dollar.  
But there is another way that Fred’s failure can be explained. It can also receive a 
metaphysical explanation by constraint and this sort of explanation is distinct both from causal 
explanations and from grounding explanations. A metaphysical explanation by constraint explains 
                                                
10 It might be thought that purported causal explanations of Candy Bar are no explanation at all because it 
mischaracterizes its explanadum as a coincidence when, in fact, it is the necessary result of a constraint. Lange 2011 
argues for a claim like this one in cases of scientific explanation by constraint. While I agree that such an explanation 
mischaracterizes its explanandum and argue for a similar claim with respect to grounding, it is not clear to me that it 
follows that purported causal explanations (and grounding explanations) are no explanations at all. Though they are 
certainly very deficient explanations, I stop short of claiming that this deficiency is enough to make them fail even to 
count as explanations.  
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why Fred failed a moment ago by showing that his failure is the result of a metaphysical constraint 
and so must occur of metaphysically necessary.  
Fred’s failure follows from a constitutive part of what it is to be the addition function. It 
does not work by charting the causal chain that resulted in his failure and so is not a causal 
explanation. It is, after all, implausible to think that a metaphysical constraint on addition caused Fred 
to fail. More strongly, the metaphysical explanation by constraint of Fred’s failure is wholly independent 
of what caused it: it is invariant to changes in the causal structure of the case. Had Fred employed a 
different method, for example, and so added the two quarters first rather than adding the quarter 
then the penny and then the quarter, he still would have failed and for precisely the same reason. His 
failure is the inevitable result of a metaphysical constraint.  
In the same way, the metaphysical explanation by constraint for Fred’s failure is not a 
grounding explanation: it doesn’t work by providing information about the way in which his failure 
was grounded. I don’t think that it is plausible to say that Fred’s failure is grounded in a metaphysical 
constraint on addition: his attempt doesn’t count as a failure in virtue of a constitutive part of the 
nature of the addition function. But we can set this claim aside as something even stronger is true. 
Just as was the case with the causes of Fred’s failure, the metaphysical explanation by constraint is 
wholly independent of what grounds Fred’s failure. Had the grounding structure of the case been 
different, Fred would have failed nonetheless and would have failed for the same reason.  
For example, had Fred failed to add twenty-five strawberries, twenty-five apples, and a grape 
to get 100 pieces of fruit or twenty-five cookies, twenty-five ice cream Sundays, and a pumpkin pie 
to get 100 desserts, the metaphysical explanation by constraint for these failures would be just the 
same: Fred fails because he must; because his failure results from a metaphysical constraint on 
addition. However the grounds for each of Fred’s failures are different: he both intended to bring 
about, and in fact brought about different states of affairs in each case. Because the grounds for 
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Fred’s failures in each of these cases are different, the grounding explanations underwritten by them 
must be different in each of these cases as well.  
As these examples show, metaphysical explanations by constraint are distinct from 
grounding explanations. Because they have different sources of explanatory power, they are 
independent of what grounds what in a way that grounding explanations cannot possibly be. 
Because they work from the top down, metaphysical explanations by constraint have the capacity to 
unify their target phenomena under a common explanation, like Fred’s failures, while grounding 
explanations cannot.    
6. Conclusion: New Explanations? 
We’ve shown that metaphysical explanations by constraint belong to a novel kind of 
metaphysical explanation. They are distinct from grounding explanations because they belong to a 
different explanatory category (they are top down rather than generative) and because they have a 
different source of explanatory power. This raises some interesting and difficult questions about the 
way in which different kinds of metaphysical explanations are related. For example, can there be 
hybrid explanations: explanations that draw explanatory power both from grounding and from 
metaphysical explanations by constraint?  
Unfortunately, I wont be able to say anything about hybrid explanations here. Instead, I’d 
like to conclude by considering another question about the relationship between these two kinds of 
metaphysical explanation. Do metaphysical explanations by constraint break new explanatory 
ground and so make possible new explanations that can’t be gotten in other ways? Or does every 
top-down metaphysical explanation by constraint have a generative partner in the form of a 
grounding explanation? Though I won’t provide a definitive argument, I want to conclude by 
offering some reasons for thinking that metaphysical explanations by constraint do not always have 
partner grounding explanations and so do have the potential to provide new explanations. 
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It is important to note, though, that the interest held by metaphysical explanation by 
constraint doesn’t depend on their ability to license new explanations. As a structurally similar 
debate in philosophy of science shows, top-down explanations are valuable even when 
corresponding generative explanations are available as well. The friendly physicist case is a good 
illustration of this. In that case, the behavior of the balloon was explained both generatively, in terms 
of the behavior of air molecules, and from the top down in terms of the principle of equivalence. 
Both of these explanations are genuine and each is illuminating in its own way. The generative 
explanation provided information about the way in which the balloon’s behavior was produced 
while top down explanation unifies it by showing how a seemingly odd occurrence fits into the 
broader scheme of things. 
In the same way, top down and generative metaphysical explanations each make distinctive 
contributions to our understanding. Each illuminates their common target in their own way by 
providing different information about the way in which it fits into the world. Generative 
metaphysical explanations provide information about the metaphysical mechanism by way of which 
the target was produced while top down metaphysical explanations unify their targets and so fit 
them into the universal scheme of things by showing their targets to be the necessary result of 
metaphysical constraints.  
Finally, it is important to note that the distinctness of metaphysical explanation by constraint 
is all that I need to show that the dominant grounding-centric view of metaphysical explanation is 
problematically incomplete. Metaphysical explanations by constraint are interesting cases of non-
grounding explanation that are overlooked by the grounding-centric view.  
That being said, here is a brief consideration in favor of the view that metaphysical 
explanations by constraint do make possible new explanations that can’t be gotten by way of 
grounding.  In cases for which metaphysical explanations by constraint and grounding explanations 
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can both be given, it seems to me that grounding explanation are seriously deficient in comparison 
with their top down partners. To see what I mean, consider the explanatory target in Armstrongian 
Laws, which asks ‘Why are there no Armstrongian laws of nature?’11 
 A grounding explanation for Armstrongian Laws would get its explanatory power by 
describing what grounds the fact that there are no Armstrongian laws. Perhaps this fact is grounded 
in a collection of facts about the actual laws of nature and their non-Armstrongian sources of 
lawhood. However, this grounding explanation is deficient because it mischaracterizes its 
explanandum.  
As the original metaphysical explanation by constraint shows, it is metaphysically impossible 
for the laws of nature to be Armstrongian: that there are no Armstrongian laws results from a 
constraint on metaphysical possibility itself. Yet, the grounding explanation in this case characterizes 
the absence of Armstrongian laws as a mere coincidence that depends on the actual laws there happen 
to be. It explains what it is in virtue of which no law is Armstrongian by showing why each of the 
laws fails to be Armstrongian, each for its own independent reason.  
For an example of a similar sort of mischaracterization, consider the following explanation 
for why it is that every scarlet marble in an urn is also red. Every scarlet marble in the urn is red 
because marble1 is scarlet and also red, marble2 is scarlet and also red, and that’s all the scarlet 
marbles there are in the urn. Because scarlet is a determinate or red, it must necessarily be the case 
that everything scarlet is also red: it is perhaps a constitutive part of what it is to be scarlet is to be 
red. Yet, this explanation characterizes the fact that all the scarlet marbles in the urn are red as a 
coincidental feature of the marbles that happen to be in the urn. Had there been additional marbles, 
it is unclear in light of this explanation whether the fact to be explained would remain the case.  
                                                
11 Lange 2011 and Forthcoming provides a structurally similar argument concerning the deficiency of causal explanations 
in the face of scientific explanations by constraint. The brief argument I present is inspired by (but distinct from) Lange’s 
argument and the structural parallel between them further reinforces the parallel relationship I have claimed between 
scientific and metaphysical explanation. 
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In the same way that all scarlet marbles are red independently of what particular marbles 
there are, there are no Armstrongian laws independently of which laws are the actual ones and what 
particular reasons the actual laws had for failing to be Armstrongian. In each of these cases, the fact 
to be explained is metaphysically necessary because it results from a metaphysical constraint. No 
matter what marbles had been in the urn, it still would have been the case that all scarlet marbles are 
red. No matter what the laws had been, or how they had acquired their lawhood, it still would have 
been the case that no law is Armstrongian.  These facts would have been the case not because of the 
particular marbles and laws that ground them but because they must be true as a result of 
metaphysical constraints. 
While both grounding explanations and metaphysical explanations by constraint can be 
given in cases like Armstrongian Laws, I’ve provided some reason to think that grounding 
explanations mischaracterize their targets and this suggests (strongly I think) that some facts are only 
well explained by metaphysical explanation by constraint. Though they are not conclusive, these 
considerations tell in favor of the claim that there are at least some facts that receive metaphysical 
explanations by constraint but that cannot be well explained by grounding explanation. Facts like 
these illustrate the promise, held out by metaphysical explanation by constraint, to license new 
explanations and so to expand the explanatory reach of metaphysics.   
Because the top-down explanations underwritten by metaphysical constraints are distinct 
from the generative explanations underwritten by grounding, neither kind can be replaced by the 
other. Both kinds ought to be included in the broader account of metaphysical explanation. Because 
the dominant grounding-centric view does not do this, it is dangerously incomplete. By focusing 
exclusively on grounding explanations, the grounding-centric view repeats the mistakes of the past, 
impoverishing our understanding of the way in which metaphysical explanation can be and hobbling 
the first-order debates that assume it. In contrast, metaphysical explanations by constraint enrich our 
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understanding of the way in which metaphysical explanation can be and offer the promise of new 
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In a range of familiar philosophical debates, participants aim to explain what it is to be some 
x by providing a reductive analysis of x, or by fully explicating it in terms of a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. This is the aim of reductionism about, for example, causation, modality, 
goodness, knowledge, and personal identity. Reductionism is an attractive view because it shows its 
target to be nothing over and above some more basic set of entities, unifying and thereby reducing 
the number of independently existing things that must be countenanced and independent 
explanations that must be provided in order to completely characterize the world. When a reductive 
analysis can’t be given, that counts in favor of primitivism: the view that the object of a theory is a 
primitive entity.1 Primitivism explains our actual failure to provide a reductive analysis of some x by 
claiming that no such reduction of x is possible.  
 Debates that proceed in this way, and so infer primitivism from the failure of reduction, 
instantiate a familiar dialectical pattern: they employ what I will call the Argument from Absence of 
Analysis.2 My aim, in what follows, is to show that the Argument from Absence of Analysis is fatally 
flawed. It rests on the mistaken assumption that reduction and primitivism exhaustively characterize 
                                                
1 More precisely, primitivism is taken to follow from the conjunction of the failure of reductionism together with the 
repugnance of eliminativism. However, I think that eliminativism is a position of last resort. Because primitivism is a live 
option in the cases I will consider, eliminativism is not an attractive position and, for my purposes, can be safely ignored. 
For a similar point, see Schaffer 2014b. 
 
2 To my knowledge, this argument was first explicitly named by David Chalmers 1996. Alexander Skiles 2014 discusses 
what I take to be the same argument under a different name: arguments that appeal to past track records of failure.   
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our dialectical options and, because of this, the inference made from the failure of reduction to the 
truth of primitivism is unjustified. Though the failure of reduction does count in favor of 
primitivism, it counts equally in favor of those non-primitivist alternatives that the argument ignores.  
 In order to show that the Argument from Absence of Analysis rests on a false assumption, I 
will offer a third dialectical option that is distinct both from reduction and from primitivism. Unlike 
reductive and primitivist views, constraintist views endeavor to characterize or explicate their objects 
by identifying properly construed metaphysical constraints on them. In doing this, I argue that 
constraintist views provide explanatorily deep characterizations of their objects, they offer accounts 
of what it is to be these objects, and so do what primitivism cannot. However, explanatory 
characterizations underwritten by metaphysical constraints are distinct from those provided by 
reductive analysis and are independent of the success of the reductive project so as to be available 
even when reductive analysis fails.  
 Because they are distinct from and independent of reduction and primitivism, constraintist 
views occupy previously hidden dialectical space in a wide range of philosophical debates, much of 
which has yet to be explored. By considering a case study drawn from the debate about personal 
identity, I show how this space might profitably be occupied. This illustrates the particular value had 
by constraintist views in debates where neither reduction nor primitivism is appealing. While such 
debates might seem to end in a stalemate between equally problematic views, philosophical progress 
can be made by considering those accounts that are underwritten by metaphysical constraints.  
2. The Argument from Absence of Analysis 
 
The Argument from Absence of Analysis is among the most central ways of motivating 
primitivism about some bit of our ontology. It is generally employed in debates where there is an 
initial presumption in favor of reduction that has led to various unsuccessful attempts to provide a 
reductive analysis. The idea, then, is that our persistent actual failure to provide a reductive analysis 
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of x, or perhaps our in principle failure to do so, provides strong evidence in favor of the claim that 
x is primitive. This might be understood as an inductive argument from our actual failure to reduce x 
to our continued future failure to do so. Alternatively, it might be understood as an abductive 
argument concluding that the best explanation for our persistent failure is that x is primitive.   
David Chalmers employs the Argument from Absence of Analysis in his 1996 as one of 
several arguments advanced in support of his primitivism about conscious experience. In order to 
provide a reductive explanation for consciousness, Chalmers claims that its proponents must give a 
story about how consciousness might possibly be entailed by physical facts. However, Chalmers 
argues that it is hard to see how any entailment from physical facts to consciousness could get off 
the ground and so it is hard to see how any reductive analysis is possible even in principle. Because it 
seems that no reductive analysis is possible, conscious experience is likely “something of a primitive” 
(Chalmers 1996, 23). 
Similarly, Ned Markosian 1998 employs the Argument from Absence of Analysis in favor of 
primitivism about composition: a view that he calls brutal composition. On Markosian’s view, 
mereological concepts form a closed circle that cannot be understood in independent terms. The 
best reason for accepting what he calls the Doctrine of Mereological Circle “is that no non-
mereological analysis of any mereological concept, including composition, seems to be 
forthcoming… no writer on mereology has ever proposed a non-mereological analysis of any 
mereological concept” (Markosian 1998, 217) 
In much the same way, Martin Lipman argues for primitive temporal passage in part by 
arguing that existing reductive accounts fail to capture temporal passage and that it isn’t clear how 
these reductive accounts might be improved (Forthcoming). Though Lipman doesn’t take the 
absence of analysis to be decisive, he does claim that it clears the ground for primitivism by showing 
that it is deserving of serious consideration.  
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 The Argument from Absence of Analysis sees pervasive use in the causal literature, where 
one of the main arguments for causal primitivism comes from our widespread failure to analyze 
causal connections in non-causal terms (cf. Schaffer 2007a and 2007b). It also appears in the 
literature on intrinsicality and is discussed in some detail in Skiles 2014.  
 Finally, examples of the Argument from Absence of Analysis need not be restricted to 
metaphysics. Moore’s famous open question argument against ethical naturalism is perhaps an 
instance of the Argument from Absence of Analysis drawn from ethics. Moore supports his 
primitivism about moral goodness by arguing, via the open question argument, that no reductive 
analysis is possible. Any purported reduction of goodness to some non-moral reductive base leaves 
open whether x is good given that x has the non-moral features present in this base. Because no 
analysis is possible, Moore claims that moral goodness is primitive (Moore 1993, 62 - 69). 
3. What are Reductionism and Primitivism Anyway? 
 
As these examples help to show, the Argument from Absence of Analysis features in a range 
of debates concerning a variety of philosophical questions. However, instances of the argument also 
illustrate that great care is required in order to understand it. This is, in part, because the argument 
and its instances often make free use of the terms ‘reductive analysis’ and ‘primitive.’ Though 
‘reductive analysis’ and ‘primitive’ are familiar terms of art that are often left unanalyzed in the 
literature, doing so hides considerable disagreement, and likely confusion, about what reduction and 
primitivism involve. My goal in what follows is not to resolve these disagreements or to clean up our 
usage, though I do think this is badly needed. Instead, I will only try to be clear about what 
commitments I take to be made by each kind of view.  
In addition to avoiding confusion, I think it is important to get clear on ‘reduction and 
‘primitive’ for two reasons. First, because they are not used univocally, a variety of distinct and 
sometimes incompatible commitments have fallen under these views. As a result, it is not obvious 
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that every way of understanding primitivism is equally well supported by the Argument from 
Absence of Analysis. It is further unclear what commitments the argument is providing evidence for 
when it provides evidence for primitivism. Second, my goal is to show that there is a third 
alternative between reduction and primitivism and, in order to do this, we will need to understand 
what reduction and primitivism are. Ultimately, though, it is more important that the views I will 
describe in the remainder of this section are recognizable and distinct. It is much less important 
what, in the end, we choose to call them.  
 Before discussing the particulars of reduction and primitivism, an important clarification 
ought to be put in place. In what follows, I restrict my attention to ontological reduction and ontological 
primitivism. Ontological reduction is distinct from various conceptual reductions, where one 
concept is reducible to others if it can be analyzed or defined in terms of them (Lewis 1970, Jackson 
2000, Chalmers and Jackson 2001, Schaffer 2008). It is also distinct from theoretical reduction, 
which is standardly understood to concern the terms found in theories so that one theory is 
reducible to another iff the terms of the first theory can be translated into or defined in terms of the 
second, which serves as its reductive base (Nagel 1978, Kim 1998, Schaffer 2008).  
  Unlike these other kinds of reduction and accompanying primitivisms, the primary aim of an 
ontological reduction is to tell us what there is in the world. It is a thesis about the world as it is 
independently of our conceptual or theoretical representations of it. In the same way, ontological 
primitives are primitive entities rather than primitive concepts or fundamental theories. In short, 
questions about reduction and primitivism are ontological questions. It is common to run different 
kinds of reduction together, particularly ontological and conceptual reduction, and this suggests an 
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important link between them. However, ontological and conceptual reductions strike me as very 
different projects and I will restrict my attention to ontological reduction and primitivism here.3   
3.1 Reduction  
 
Having restricted our attention in this way, reductionism about some entity x is the view that 
x can be reduced to some more basic and independent y or y’s.4 I will not offer an account of what 
is required for a successful ontological reduction or of how it is that reductions explain their targets. 
In addition to being extremely difficult, I suspect that any such account would also be objectionably 
artificial given the diversity of usage in the literature. Rather, I’ll adopt J.C.C. Smart’s influential but 
tentative description of reduction as a minimal commitment. As Smart claims, “an entity x reduces 
to an entity y only if x does not exist over and above y” (Smart 1959, 143). I take this to be a 
characteristic claim made by reductive views in virtue of being reductive. This description is 
animated by the broadly Humean thought that reduced entities depend on and arise from patterns in 
the fundamental entities. Reduced entities are nothing over and above the fundamental entities and 
relations among them in roughly the same way that a movie is nothing over and above its frames 
(Schaffer 2014b, Lewis 1994).  
 In addition to this minimal commitment, I take it that reductions must be asymmetric and so 
have a preferred direction. If x can be reduced to some independent y or y’s, then its reductive base 
is in some sense prior to, more basic then, or perhaps more fundamental than x. Skiles 2014 calls 
this the relative fundamentality requirement and considers it to be a necessary condition on reduction. It is 
also reflected in Jeffrey King’s 1996 compositional view of reduction and underwrites the 
connection between reduction and parsimony, the idea being that reduced entities are not 
                                                
3 It is sometimes claimed that primitivism is theory relative so that some x might count as a primitive relative to one 
theory and as a derivative entity relative to another. Jennifer Wang’s 2013 modal primitivism is an example of this sort. 
However, I am skeptical that robust ontological primitivism can be theory relative in this way. Because I am restricting 
my attention to ontological primitivism, I will assume that being primitive is an absolute state throughout.  
 
4 I use the term ‘entity’ to refer to parts of our ontology regardless of the ontological category to which they belong.  
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ontologically rock bottom but that their ultimate reductive bases might be. Finally, asymmetry is 
required in order for some explanations to be backed by reduction, as they are commonly taken to 
be, while avoiding viciously circular explanations.   
 On the traditional view, ontological reductions are secured by identities between reduced 
entities and their reductive bases, as when the identity theory of mind reduces type or token mental 
states to type or token brain states by identifying one with the other. Just as water is nothing over 
and above H2O, Hesperus and Phosphorus are nothing over and above Venus, and lightning is 
nothing over and above electrical discharge, “sensations are nothing over and above brain 
processes” because they are strictly identical to them (Smart 1959, Kripke 1980. See also Skiles 2014 
and Schroder 2005).  
 However, ontological reduction might also be affected by way of a properly construed claim 
of ontological dependence. On this view, derivative entities are nothing over and above the more 
fundamental entities on which they depend and so can be reduced to these more fundamental 
entities. Gideon Rosen gives voice to this sort of view with his Grounding-Reduction Link: “If 
[worldly fact] p’s being the case consists in [worldly fact] q’s being the case, then p is true in virtue of 
the fact that q” (2010, 123). The connection between dependence and reduction is further discussed 
by Skiles 2014. Finally, it is reflected in Occam’s Laser, which is proposed by Schaffer (2014b) and 
forbids the unnecessary proliferation of fundamental entities. Occam’s Laser is distinguished from his 
more familiar Razor by allowing for the multiplication of derivative entities the idea being that 
because they are grounded in the fundamental, they are an “ontological free lunch” and so require 
no additional ontological commitment (Schaffer 2014b, 648).  
 Finally, necessary equivalence claims, of the kind most closely associated with supervenience 
based non-reductive physicalism, may well count as reductive provided that they can be understood 
asymmetrically and so satisfy the relative fundamentality requirement. Though supervenience is 
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weaker than dependence and reductive identity and doesn’t entail either kind of relationship, it does 
support the claim that there is some sense in which supervening entities are nothing over and their 
bases. I discuss supervenience-based views in more detail in section 3.3.  
 Although it remains to be seen whether a complete account of ontological reduction can be 
given, I take it that reductive views can be united under the minimal claim that reduced entities are 
nothing over and above their reductive bases. It is this claim that, when made concerning some 
particular entity, x, is the central point of contention between reductionists and their primitivist 
opponents.  
3.2 Primitivism  
 
 Primitivism about some x is the view that x is an ontological primitive. However like 
reduction, the notion ‘ontological primitive’ does not enjoy univocal use. Again, I won’t try to 
provide an account of ontological primitives here. However as with reduction, I do think that that a 
minimal commitment can straightforwardly be identified. Minimally, if some x is an ontological 
primitive, then it cannot be reductively analyzed and so cannot be comprehensively and non-
circularly characterized in fundamentally different terms. Call any view that makes this commitment 
minimal primitivism.  
In this sprit, Markosian justifies his primitivism about composition by arguing that there are 
no non-trivial and necessarily true principles linking composition to non-mereological concepts or 
relations (1998). Chalmers’ denies that consciousness ‘logically supervenes’ on the physical, and 
Skiles claims that intrinsicness cannot be “comprehensively, compactly, and non-circularly 
characterized in more fundamental terms” (Chalmers 1996 and Skiles 2014, 221). Because primitive 
entities cannot be reduced, they are something over and above the rest: there is no reductive base in 
addition to which they are an ontological free lunch.  
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 Minimal primitivism is the most common way of explicitly characterizing primitivism in the 
literature. However, it seems to me to be much too weak to capture the position most often 
defended by actual primitivists. Minimal primitivism is a purely negative view that leaves open, in 
large part, what primitive entities are like. As a result, it runs together a range of very different non-
reductive views that are best kept separate. For example, non-reductive physicalism seems to belong 
to a different kind than Cartesian substance dualism, despite the fact that both views deny 
reductionism about the mental. On substance dualism, mental substances are sui generis and are 
merely causally related to physical ones, while the non-reductive physicalist claims that the mental 
supervenes on or is realized by the physical and is not sui generis. Though supervenience perhaps 
falls short of reduction, it is sufficiently tight so as to preserve the primacy of the physical in a way 
that substance dualism does not. 
 As a result, minimal primitivism is often supplemented by other commitments and so made 
stronger by its proponents. Primitive entities are widely thought to be the atoms of our ontology and 
so to provide the foundation for reductive analysis. This is reflected, for example, in Kit Fine’s claim 
that “intuitively, one proposition will reduce to others if they bring us closer to what is real” (2001, 
26). On Fine’s view, reality is primitive and, because what is real is not reducible, it is the primitive 
foundation to which successive reductions draw near.  
Primitive entities are often claimed to be sui generis or at least to form closed circles of 
interrelated entities and, as a result, there is very little that can be done, even in principle, to 
characterize them. Lipman Forthcoming, for example, claims that any description of temporal 
passage in independent terms is bound to be metaphorical, while David Barnet 2009 claims that he 
is incapable of explaining what vagueness is in a non-circular and independent way. It is because of 
this that primitives like grounding are often introduced by example, as no independent 
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characterization of them is possible. In addition to resisting reductive analysis, ontological primitives 
are supposed to be sui generis, basic or fundamental constituents of our ontology.  
As I have presented them here, there are no cognitive or epistemic restrictions that are 
constitutive either of reduction or of primitivism. Reductions, for example, need not be a priori or 
appeal to conceptual truth.5 Instead, neither notion essentially involves representational objects and 
neither is primarily epistemic. However despite being mind independent in this way, both reduction 
and primitivism are widely thought to have significant implications for explanation.  
Reduction (or better the relations that underwrite it) is widely thought to be among those 
elite relations that back explanation so that reductive bases explain what they reduce: generally, if x 
reduces to y then y explains x.6 By reducing their targets, reductive theories bring about a kind of 
unification. Reductions make the theories that contain them more parsimonious by reducing the 
number of independent ontological commitments that must be made. They also reduce the number 
of independent explanations that must be provided, by the lights of the theory, in order to supply a 
complete account of the world.    
While it is an open question how best to characterized it, the tie between explanation and 
reduction is widely endorsed so that reduction seems to be the primary way in which philosophical 
accounts explain their targets, where providing such an explanatory characterization is a central aim 
of metaphysical theorizing. To give a reduction of x is to give an account of what it is to be x or for 
x to obtain. Reductive analyses of causation, modality, and temporal passage are all taken to explain 
what it is to be their objects so that by providing a successful reductive analysis of them, we have 
provided a successful explanatory characterization of them. Requests for explanation and requests 
                                                
5 This is not the case on other accounts of reduction that are more closely allied to conceptual analysis. For an example 
of such an account see Chalmers and Jackson 2001.  
 
6 Despite this connection to explanation, ontological reductions as I understand them are distinct from what might be 
called epistemic reductions, where some fact or entity is reducible to others if that fact or entity can be completely 
explained in terms of them (cf. Nagel 1979). 
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for reduction are often conflated, as is illustrated by Markosian’s discussion of van Inwagen’s general 
composition question (1998, 213), so that in this case as in many others, a request for reductive 
analysis is paraphrased as a request for an explanatory characterization.  
In contrast, a common complaint about primitivism is that it “fails to do what any viable 
philosophical account is supposed to do: provide at least some explanatory understanding of the 
phenomena” (Skiles 2014, 20). Because primitive entities are supposed to be sui generis and 
fundamental, many facts about them are brute so that, by hypothesis, there is no explanatory 
characterization available providing information about what it is to be some primitive entity. Though 
primitivism need not be wholly uninformative, we can still uncover interesting facts about them and 
their distribution, primitive entities are basic and so there is a sense in which they are epistemically 
inaccessible in principle: they can’t be explained in independent, non-circular terms so that we are 
often reduced to metaphor or example. By adopting primitivism about some x and so giving up 
reductionism, we are giving up on the project of providing a deep and informative characterizations 
or explanations of x.  
3.3 What About Non-Reductive Views? 
 
Recall that the Argument from Absence of Analysis infers primitivism about some x from 
our persistent (actual or in principle) failure to provide a reductive analysis of x. However, in light of 
the foregoing discussion about primitivism and reduction it might be worried that, in performing 
this inference, the argument ignores a range of salient views that are neither reductive nor primitivist. 
I am sympathetic to this worry and I will soon argue that views underwritten by metaphysical 
constraints bear it out. However, I don’t think that existing non-reductive views are sufficient to 
make the case against the Argument from Absence of Analysis because it isn’t clear that they 
genuinely fall between reduction and primitivism. In spite of this, non-reductive views attempt to 
make good on an important insight: that there is dialectical space between reduction and primitivism. I 
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will argue, in section 4, that metaphysical constraints provide a way of making good on this insight 
and so of articulating the idea that animates existing non-reductive views.   
To see why the strategies employed by existing non-reductive views are not straightforwardly 
successful, consider that there is a general argument available to the friend of the Argument from 
Absence of Analysis suggesting that minimal primitivism and reduction cleanly partition the space of 
logically possible views. It is plausible that any true reduction is necessarily true. So, if x cannot be 
reduced to some independent y (no actual reduction can be had) then it follows that no reduction of 
x is possible. Yet, this is precisely what minimal primitivism claims. The negation of reductionism 
entails minimal primitivism so that, it would seem, no view can fail to belong in either category and 
so go between reduction and minimal primitivism.  
 In addition, it is unclear whether existing non-reductive views genuinely fall between robust 
primitivism and reduction, where robust primitivism supplements the minimal commitment above 
with the claim that primitive entities are fundamental, sui generis, and in an important sense 
inexplicable. This is because many existing non-reductive views seem to be unstable and so threaten 
to collapse into either primitivism or reduction upon further examination. It is plausible that at least 
some such non-reductive views were never meant to be stable in this way. Though they deny 
reductive identity statements and so are not classically reductive, they were never intended to avoid 
reduction in the broader sense that I have proposed.  
For an example of this instability, consider a familiar non-reductive view drawn from the 
debate about physicalism. While there is much debate about how best to state the central thesis of 
physicalism, it can be roughly characterized as the claim that the world is at bottom physical: there is 
some sense in which there is nothing over and above the physical phenomena (cf. Melynk 2008 and 
Ney 2008). While reductive physicalism aims to reduce the mental to the physical by way of 
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reductively identifying mental and physical phenomena, non-reductive physicalism is distinct in 
virtue of its rejection of these identities.  
Instead of strict identity, non-reductive physicalism involves, at minimum, the supervenience of 
the mental on the physical the idea being that while mental phenomena are not identical to physical 
phenomena, the mental is nonetheless nothing over and above the physical. There can be no mental 
change or difference without a corresponding physical change or difference. Many supervenience 
theses are available and come in a variety of scopes and strengths. However, each involves a relation 
of necessary covariation and, as a result, each is weaker than reductive identity and insufficient for it.  
Though non-reductive physicalism purports to resist the reduction of the mental to the 
physical, it isn’t clear that this is the case: there is a tension between the non-reductive credentials of 
any such view and its physicalist aspirations. First, if non-reductive physicalism is genuinely 
physicalism then it is not clearly non-reductive. To see this, consider that physicalism of any sort 
seems to require the commitment that there is nothing over and above the physical. Yet I have 
claimed that this constitutes a minimal commitment characteristic of ontological reduction. In 
addition, non-reductive physicalism involves the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical, 
yet supervenience claims are often claimed to be sufficient for reduction in other contexts, as in the 
debate about causal primitivism (cf. Schaffer 2008b).  
Second, if non-reductive physicalism is genuinely non-reductive then, as Andrew Meylnyk 
argues in his 2008, it is not plausibly sufficiently strong as to count as physicalism: it doesn’t clearly 
secure the claim that the mental is nothing over and above the physical. While proper physicalism 
rules out primitivism about the mental, supervenience based non-reductive physicalism is consistent 
with it. This is because supervenience requires necessary covariation between the physical and the 
mental. However, it does not explain this necessary covariation or even require that it be explainable 
at all. As a result, supervenience based physicalism is consistent with a state of affairs in which the 
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mental might supervenes on the physical but where this supervenience is a brute modal relationship 
among two entirely distinct primitive kinds of entities (Meylnyk 2008. See also Kim 1993 and 
Horgan 1993).  
As this case illustrates, existing non-reductive views do not straightforwardly reveal 
dialectical space between reduction and primitivism and so do not straightforwardly entail that the 
Argument from Absence of Analysis is flawed.7 However, these views do reflect the important 
insight that such a region of dialectical space might exist. In the following section, I will argue that 
metaphysical constraints make good on the insight animating non-reductive views by underwriting 
metaphysical theories that are neither reductive nor primitivist. While it may not fall to familiar non-
reductive views, constraintist views are sufficient to show the that the Argument from Absence of 
Analysis is fatally flawed.   
4. Metaphysical Constraints and the Argument from Absence of Analysis 
  
 Though not straightforwardly revealed by familiar non-reductive views, a tension has 
emerged between the Argument from Absence of Analysis and the conclusion that it is intended to 
support. The Argument from Absence of Analysis concludes, on the basis of our persistent actual or 
in principle failure to provide a reductive analysis of some x, that x is likely to be a primitive entity. 
While this is plausible if primitivism about x is understood as minimal primitivism, the view that no 
reductive analysis of x can be given, we have seen that primitivism is often much richer.8 Minimal 
primitivism about some x is nearly always accompanied by claims that x is fundamental, sui generis, 
                                                
7 There are, of course, a variety of non-reductive views available and the argument I have offered does not touch these 
views directly. I do, however, expect that the issues I have raised for supervenience based non-reductive views to 
generalize to other non-reductive ones, particularly those backed by realization. Ultimately, though, I am willing to allow 
that the failure of the Argument from Absence of Analysis might be overdetermined. What is significant, for my 
purposes, is that its failure isn’t obvious given the existence of purportedly non-reductive views.  
 
8 If minimal primitivism were the intended conclusion of the Argument from Absence of Analysis, the argument would 
often be trivial or at least uninteresting. In its general guise, for example, it would conclude that no reductive analysis is 
possible on the basis of our in principle failure to provide one. Yet, the premise and conclusion are very much the same 
in these cases: if a reduction can’t be provided even in principle then it is not possible.  
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and in some important sense inexplicable: there is no explanatory characterization available 
providing information about what it is to be x. Yet, the absence of reductive analysis seems not to 
be a good reason to endorse all of these claims. The tension between the Argument from Absence 
of Analysis and the conclusion that it aspires to support gives us reason to suspect that there is room 
between the argument and its conclusion.  
In this section, I intend to make good on that suspicion by offering a novel way of providing 
an explanatory characterization, backed by metaphysical constraints, that stands between primitivism 
and reduction and serves as an alternative to each. Though it is distinct from and, perhaps even 
incompatible with primitivism about some x, an account of x underwritten by metaphysical 
constraints is available even when a reductive analysis is not.9 As a result, the persistent actual or in 
principle failure to provide a reductive analysis does not straightforwardly and uniquely support 
primitivism of the robust kind that is typically endorsed. Instead, the Argument from Absence of 
Analysis is deficient because it omits a salient alternative. The availability of constraintist theories 
shows in a general way that the Argument from Absence of Analysis is, at best, too fast. 
By showing that the Argument from Absence of Analysis is deficient, we deprive primitivism 
of one of its central avenues of support (though I don’t dispute that for some things, there remain 
good reasons for thinking that they are primitive). However, the availability of constraintist theories 
and the explanatory characterizations that they provide also, I will argue, promises to open up new 
dialectical space in a range of debates in which participants had previously restricted themselves 
either to primitivism or reductive analysis. Theories that make use of constraints in order to 
characterize their targets are worthy of philosophical development so that, by providing new 
                                                
9 Whether or not this sort of view is incompatible with primitivism depends on how it is understood. As I will soon 
claim, constraintist views are compatible with minimal primitivism though they don’t require that it be true. However, 
they are incompatible with robust primitivism.  
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explanatory resources that are more broadly available then those furnished by reduction, constraints 
license illuminating characterizations of their targets.  
4.1 Metaphysical Constraints  
 
 In order to show that metaphysical constraints can underwrite explanatory characterizations 
of their targets, that these explanatory characterizations promise to open up new dialectical space, 
and that the existence of this new space makes suspect the Argument from Absence of Analysis, I 
need to say a bit about what metaphysical constraints are and how they are capable of doing the 
work that I’ve set out for them. 
 On my view, a metaphysical constraint on some entity, x, is identical to a constitutive part of 
the nature of x.10 Intuitively, the constraints on x just are parts of what it is to be x. If something is a 
part of the nature of x, then it must be the case in every possible world in which x exists. So, 
metaphysical constraints are deserving of their names because they constrain the behavior of their 
objects, placing limits on the way that they can be across possible worlds.  
 Metaphysical constraints are parts of natures and so ought not be confused with conceptual 
truths or platitudes. The constraints on some x are constitutive parts of the nature of x, while 
platitudes and conceptual truths concern the ‘x’ concept. In the same way, they ought not be 
confused with merely necessary truths, as not all necessary truths about some x are plausibly parts of 
the nature of x.11 Because metaphysical constraints are constitutive parts of natures, they require no 
additional ontological commitment: they are no additions of being over and above natures. 
                                                
10 It is important to notice that natures are distinct from related notions like essences. Historically, terms like ‘nature’ and 
‘essence’ have been used interchangeably. However, ‘essence’ has recently acquired a particular technical meaning in light 
of influential work by Kit Fine (See e.g. Fine 1994). I take it (though I will not argue this point here) that we have some 
intuitive concept of nature, independent of the technical notion of essence, that is not naturally understood in Finean 
terms. This, and not identifying Finean essences, is what partisans in the debates I discuss take themselves to be 
uncovering. By discovering the nature of x, we’re discovering what it is to be x and so giving an account of what x is. 
Unlike Finean essences, natures are not propositional and need not be understood as real definitions of their objects.  
 
11 Consider the following fact: ‘x is worldmates with the fact that 1+1=2.’ This fact is metaphysically necessary but is not 
plausibly a constitutive part of the nature of x. Much the same this is true for any necessary truth we might choose to 
append to x.  
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However, this doesn’t mean that constraints add nothing to what was already provided by natures. 
Rather, I claim here and in earlier chapters that metaphysical constraints ought to be adopted as new 
pieces of the ideology of our best theory. Metaphysical constraints provide a new way of thinking 
about a part of the world, natures, that extends our understanding of metaphysics and, so I claim, 
provides a new avenue by which progress in metaphysical debates can be made. 
 For an example of a plausible metaphysical constraint, consider the relationship between free 
will and the power to do otherwise. The idea that free will requires the power to do otherwise has 
such intuitive force that it is tempting to posit a tight relationship between free will and alternate 
possibilities. This relationship is often enshrined in the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (AP), 
which states that a person acted freely, and so is morally responsible for an action, only if she could 
have done otherwise. A plausible way of understanding the tight relationship enshrined in AP is to 
understand it as a metaphysical constraint on free will and so as a constitutive part of its nature. Part 
of what it is to have free will is to have the power to do otherwise. If this is the case, then there is a 
necessary connection between free will and the power to do otherwise so that, in every possible 
world in which agents will freely, it must be the case that these agents could have done other than 
the did.  
 For a very different example, consider the uniqueness of composition, which is (if true) 
plausibly a metaphysical constraint on the composition relation. Composition is unique if it is the 
case that for any composite objects x and y that have exactly the same proper parts, x is identical to 
y (See Lewis 1991, 74 as well as Varzi 2008, Simons 1987, and Sider 2007). That composition is 
unique is a constitutive part of the nature of the composition relation because uniqueness partially 
constitutes the distinctive relationship between parts and wholes. It identifies the conditions under 
which two composite objects are identical such that they are identical iff they share exactly the same 
proper parts. Uniqueness is also responsible for the extensionality of parthood and the purported 
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innocence of mereology: the idea that wholes are so closely related to the pluralities of their parts 
that they are ontologically thin and, in some sense, are nothing over and above them.  
As each of these cases illustrates, metaphysical constraints underwrite explanatorily deep 
characterizations of their objects. By uncovering that a part of what it is to have free will is to have 
the power to do otherwise and so by capturing a metaphysical constraint on free will, a theory of 
free will partially explains what it is for a will to be free. Similarly, by uncovering that composition is 
unique, a theory of composition captures a constitutive part of its nature and so provides a partial 
explanation of what it is to be the composition relation.   
 These cases suggest a generalizable picture of the way in which metaphysical constraints can 
be used to underwrite explanatorily deep characterizations of the kind offered by metaphysical 
theories. Namely, one way of providing an explanatorily deep characterization of some x is to 
capture a metaphysical constraint on x. Because metaphysical constraints are identical to constitutive 
parts of the natures of their objects, information about them constitutes correct, necessary, and 
informative answers to questions of the form ‘what is it to be x.’ Parts of natures are, after all, just 
constitutive parts of what it is to be their objects. By identifying and precisely grasping the 
metaphysical constraints on phenomena like composition and free will, we better understand what it 
is for a will to be free and what it is for composition to obtain.  
4.2 Constraints Needn’t Affect Reduction 
 
 Like reductive analyses, metaphysical constraints underwrite explanatorily deep 
characterizations of their objects.  However, as I will argue in this section, metaphysical constraints 
need not support or entail reductions when underwriting these explanatory characterizations so that 
theories that account for their objects by employing metaphysical constraints need not do so by 
providing reductive analyses. Instead, metaphysical constraints underwrite a way of characterizing 
entities that is independent of reduction and so is available even when reductive analysis is not. 
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Constraintist theories are genuinely distinct from reductive ones: though they provide explanatory 
deep characterizations of their objects they need not do so by providing covert reductions. 
In order to see this, recall Smart’s description of reduction, which I take to be a minimal 
commitment shared by all reductive views in virtue of being reductive. As Smart claims, “an entity x 
reduces to an entity y only if x does not exist over and above y” (Smart 1959, 143). In order to count 
as reductive in light of this minimal commitment, it must be the case that metaphysical constraints 
serve as parts of the reductive base of the entities that they constrain so that these entities are 
nothing over and above the metaphysical constraints on them. This is precisely the claim that 
Constraintist theories ought to reject: things are not ontological free lunches in addition to their 
constraints and instead do seem to exist over and above them.   
In order to see that constraints need not serve as reductive bases, consider that it is 
sometimes the case that metaphysical constraints take their objects as constitutive parts. Yet, this 
can’t occur if things are nothing over and above the constraints on them.  The Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities (AP), which I have suggested serves as a constraint on free will, is like this. AP claims 
that a person acted freely, and so is morally responsible for an action, only if she could have done 
otherwise. In doing so, AP sets out a necessary relationship between free will and the power to do 
otherwise such that standing in this relationship is a constitutive part of what it is for a will to be 
free. However, that free will and the power to do otherwise are so related is itself a state of affairs 
that is plausibly (at least partially) constituted by its relata and, as a result, it is plausible that the AP 
constraint on free will has free will as a constitutive part.  
For another example like this, consider the Uniqueness constraint on composition, which I 
have claimed is a metaphysical constraint on the composition relation. Composition is unique if it is 
the case that for any composite objects x and y that have exactly the same proper parts, x is identical 
to y (See Lewis 1991, 74 as well as Varzi 2008, Simons 1987, and Sider 2007). The uniqueness of 
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composition helps to set out the individuation conditions for composite objects, but in 
distinguishing composite objects from mereologically simple ones it makes free use of the 
composition relation: composite objects are those objects that are composed of parts.12 In each of 
these examples, the metaphysical constraints on some x themselves involve x. As a result, any 
reductive analysis of x that includes these constraints in its reductive base is doomed to include the 
target of the analysis in the analysis itself. Such a tightly circular analysis is doomed to fail.    
The existence of constraints like these also show that metaphysical constraints violate the 
relative fundamentality requirement on reduction: the idea that if x can be reduced to some 
independent y or y’s, then this reductive base is in some sense prior to, more basic than, or perhaps 
more fundamental than x. Unlike reductive analyses, metaphysical constraints need not be 
independent of or more fundamental than their targets. We have seen that the constraints on some x 
sometimes involve x directly and so are not independent of or fundamental than their targets. While 
the circle made by constraints and their objects need not be this tight, it is often the case that 
metaphysical constraints and their objects stand as parts of a closed circle of interrelated entities like 
the ones plausibly formed by mereological, modal, and moral properties. Because metaphysical 
constraints are constitutive parts of natures, they need not be wholly independent of their objects: 
nothing seems to prevent mereological relations, for example, from having mereological natures. 
However, reductions must be wholly independent of their objects if they hope to avoid triviality or 
vicious circularity.  
In addition to these general considerations against reductive metaphysical constraints, it 
should also be noted that metaphysical constraints are not plausibly related to their objects in ways 
                                                
12 Because mereological notions are interdefinable, we are not obligated to understand uniqueness in terms of 
composition: it could just as well be understood in terms of overlap or parthood for example. What is important for our 
purposes, thought, is that understanding uniqueness and composite object in terms of composition doesn’t seem to 
involve a mistake even though uniqueness is, if true, a constraint on composition. Finally, though we have some choices 
about our primitive mereological notions, we cannot formulate uniqueness in non-mereological terms.  For more on this 
see Simons 1987, Varzi 2008, and Lewis 1991. 
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that are commonly thought to bring about reduction. This provides an additional reason for thinking 
that entities genuinely are something over and above the constraints to which they are subject.  
One way an entity might be reduced to its constraints is if that entity can be shown to be 
identical with those constraints. However, this isn’t plausibly the case. Indeed, entities need not even 
be of the same ontological category as the constraints on them. While composition is a relation among 
concrete objects, for example, the metaphysical constraints on composition are not plausibly 
relations among concrete objects. Instead, I have claimed that constraints are worldly facts, like the 
fact that composition is unique, or perhaps are parts of a single complex fact. For the same reason, 
entities are not plausibly identical to the complete set of constraints on them: their complete natures. 
The set of all constraints on composition, for example, is a set of states of affairs or a single complex 
state of affairs rather than a relation among concrete objects. Because relations are not identical with 
states of affairs, composition is not identical to the metaphysical constraints on composition, either 
taken individually or collectively. 
Another way that an entity might be reduced to its metaphysical constraints is if that entity is 
grounded (either wholly or partly) in its constraints. This isn’t plausibly the case either. Because 
metaphysical constraints need not be, and often are not, independent of the entities they constrain, 
attempts to ground objects in their constraints need not respect the irreflexivity of the grounding 
relation and so threaten impermissible cases in which objects wholly or partly ground themselves. 
Perhaps both AP and the uniqueness of composition would be cases like this. As a result, it is not 
clear that the requisite grounding claims can even satisfy the formal requirements typically placed on 
grounding.  
 Even if we assume that the requisite grounding claims can consistently be made, I think that 
they will often ring false. It seems not to be the case, for example, that the composition relation 
exists and has the features it does in virtue of the fact that, for any composite objects x and y that 
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have exactly the same proper parts, x is identical to y. The composition relation may not be 
grounded at all. But if it is grounded, it is not grounded in the relationship between parthood and 
identity.  
Finally, grounding is a generative relation that is often taken to serve as a kind of 
metaphysical analog of causation. “Roughly speaking, just as causation links the world across time, 
grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less 
fundamental” (Schaffer 2012, 122. See also Sider 2001, Schaffer 2014a, and Wilson 2014). This 
means that less fundamental entities exist and have the features they do in virtue of the more 
fundamental entities that ground them. But metaphysical constraints and their objects need not 
stand in generative relations to one another: entities seem not to be generated from what it is to be 
them.13 
In light of these considerations, it is implausible that metaphysical constraints serve as the 
basis for reductive analyses. Though metaphysical constraints do back explanatorily deep 
characterizations of their objects, I take it to be unappealing, in general, to claim that objects are an 
ontological free lunch and so are nothing over and above the metaphysical constraints on them. 
Metaphysical constraints do not themselves bring about reductions.  
Because they are distinct from reductive bases in this way, metaphysical constraints are 
wholly independent of reductive analysis more generally so that they might be available even when 
no reductive analysis is possible. While it might be true in principle, for example, that no reductive 
analysis of composition is possible, the uniqueness of composition is nonetheless a plausible 
constraint on composition (again, if it is true at all) and so is nonetheless a constitutive part of what 
it is to be the composition relation.  
                                                
13 In addition, grounding and metaphysical constraints function differently in explanatory contexts and plausibly back 
different sorts of explanation. For an argument to this effect see chapter 2. 
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The existence of constraints like these in no way depends on whether composition is 
nothing over and above some independent further entity. As a result, metaphysical constraints and 
the explanatory characterizations that they underwrite are fully independent of, and so are neutral 
with respect to, reductive and non-reductive commitments: they are consistent with commitments of 
either kind. Metaphysical constraints show that the issue of whether an explanatory characterization 
for some x is available is orthogonal to questions concerning whether and how x might be reduced. 
Because they underwrite explanatorily rich characterizations of their targets, theories that 
uncover metaphysical constraints share many of the explanatory virtues enjoyed by those theories 
that aim to provide reductive analyses. In order to contrast each view with primitivism, I will focus 
on the fact that they provide such characterizations at all. However, because constraintist theories 
are independent of reductive analysis, they, unlike their reductive counterparts, are not hostage to 
the availability of reductive analysis and so are available even when the reductive project fails. 
4.3 Constraintism is not Primitivism  
 
 Metaphysical constraints need not underwrite reductive analyses so that metaphysical 
theories underwritten by metaphysical constraints provide explanatory characterizations of their 
objects while failing to reduce them. A constraintist account of some x remains available even if, 
despite our best efforts, no reductive account of x has been or can be given. So, in the spirit of the 
Argument from Absence of Analysis it might be thought that such constraintist accounts are 
committed to primitivism about their objects. However, I will argue that this is not the case either. 
Though metaphysical constraints do not support reductive analyses, their objects need not be 
primitive entities. Instead, metaphysical constraints underwrite a way of providing explanatory 
characterizations of their objects that is distinct both from reduction and primitivism and stands 
between them, preserving the virtues of each without the costs of either.  
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To begin, constraintist theories need not endorse minimal primitivism about their objects: the 
claim that no reductive analysis of them is possible. Though I have argued that metaphysical 
constraints can underwrite explanatory characterizations of their objects independently of whether 
or not a reductive analysis of them can be given, this does not imply that explanatory 
characterizations underwritten by metaphysical constraints are incompatible with the existence of a 
successful reductive analysis. Rather, constraintist theories are indifferent to the success or failure of 
reduction and so can refrain from endorsing minimal primitivism for the same reason that they can 
refrain from endorsing reductionism: metaphysical constraints and the explanatory characterizations 
that they underwrite are available in either case. This is compatible with the claim that reduction and 
minimal primitivism partition the space of logically possible views about what can be reduced to what. 
The availability of constraintist views shows that the question of whether an explanatory 
characterization of some x can be given outruns the question of whether an ontological reduction of 
x can be provided.  
Suppose, however, that constraintist theories are required to endorse minimal primitivism. 
Very little is lost if this is the case. This is because even if the explanatory characterizations 
underwritten by metaphysical constraints are possible only insofar as reductive analyses are not, it 
remains the case that minimal primitivism is quite weak and so, in practice, is often supplemented 
with a variety of stronger claims. Constraintist theories ought to reject these stronger claims and so 
are not committed to robust primitivism in the way that Chalmers 1996 is committed to primitivism 
about the mental, Lipman Forthcoming is committed to primitivism about passage, or Moore 1993 
is committed to primitivism about the moral. Because this robust sort of primitivism is the intended 
conclusion of the Argument from Absence of Analysis, metaphysical constraints fill a gap between 
reduction and primitivism that is not recognized by the argument.   
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 On the robust way in which they are often understood, primitive entities are sui generis and 
fundamental. Because of this, many facts about them are brute so that no explanatory 
characterization illuminating what it is to be some primitive entity is possible. Though it is not the 
case that primitive entities are totally mysterious (it is true that we can uncover interesting facts 
about primitive entities and their distribution) primitive entities are in a certain sense epistemically 
inaccessible.  
 Because metaphysical constraints underwrite explanatory characterizations of their objects 
and so provide information about what it is to be them, constraintist theories are at odds with 
robust primitivism. If something can receive an explanatorily deep characterization underwritten by 
the metaphysical constraints on it, then it need not be ontologically fundamental and is not 
epistemically inaccessible in the way that primitive entities are meant to be. We are not reduced to 
metaphor or example when explaining what it is to be the object of constraint because we can 
provide an informative account of what it is to be that object by understanding the metaphysical 
constraints on it. While primitivist theories are often accused of failing to provide any explanatory 
understanding of the phenomena, an account backed by metaphysical constraints is not guilty of any 
such failure. In other words, constraintist theories are distinct from primitivist ones because they can 
do what primitivist theories cannot: provide explanatorily deep characterizations of their entities.  
5.  Constraints Reveal Hidden Dialectical Space  
 
It is time to take stock. I’ve argued that, though the Argument from Absence of Analysis 
enjoys wide application in philosophy, it rests on the mistaken assumption that reduction and 
primitivism exhaustively characterize our dialectical options: if something cannot be reduced then it 
must be a primitive entity. In order to show that the Argument from Absence of Analysis is 
dubious, I offered a way of explaining what it is to be some bit of our ontology underwritten by 
metaphysical constraints that is distinct from primitivism and independent of reduction. That these 
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kinds of explanatorily characterizations are available opens the way for a new dialectical option: 
though we may be unable to reductively analyze some x, we may still be able to provide an 
explanatory characterization of it underwritten by its metaphysical constraints and so need not 
conclude that x is a primitive entity.   
That this distinct constraintist option is available is bad news for the Argument from 
Absence of Analysis. However, I think that it is good news for metaphysics more generally. This is 
because ontological reduction is widely and maybe even generally unavailable. However, 
explanatorily deep characterizations are still possible underwritten by metaphysical constraints so 
that we need not abandon the explanatory project to primitivism. By discovering that Constraintist 
theories are available, we discover previously hidden dialectical space that has, in many cases, yet to 
be explored. In this section, I’ll present the debate concerning personal identity in some detail in 
order to provide a case study illustrating how the dialectical space opened by metaphysical 
constraints might be occupied.  
 
5.1 Case Study: Personal Identity 
 
 By opening new dialectical space, metaphysical constraints make available an avenue by 
which progress might be made in a range of debates. This is especially promising in debates in which 
reductionist and primitivist opponents have fought to a stalemate. To see this, let’s consider the 
debate about the metaphysics of personal identity concerning the so-called persistence question. 
Although care should be exercised in stating the question, it is often asked as follows: “under what 
possible circumstances is a person who exists at one time identical with something that exists at 
another time” (Olson 2015, 4). The question is often paraphrased as a request for necessary and 
sufficient conditions: “what is necessary and sufficient for a past or future being to be you” (Olson 
2015, 4)? The aim here is to provide a criterion of personal identity that reduces it to a set of 
conditions that are individually necessary, jointly sufficient, and informative: that is, they are non-
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trivial and independent of personal identity. These conditions serve as a reductive base for personal 
identity so that what it is for a person to persist over time is nothing over and above their satisfying 
these conditions.   
 Attempts to provide such a reductive analysis, and so to explain what it is for a person to 
persist over time, have come in roughly two kinds. On the first kind of approach, which I’ll call the 
psychological approach, proponents claim that some psychological relation is necessary and 
sufficient for persistence. One candidate reductive base is psychological connection. A being at 
some future time is psychologically connected with you at the present time if she is in the 
psychological states she is at some future time because or largely because of the psychological states 
that you are in now (Shoemaker 1984, Olson 2015). Another candidate is psychological continuity. A 
being at some future time is psychologically continuous with you at the present time if some of your 
current mental states are related to her mental states by way of a chain of psychological connection. 
Psychological continuity is plausibly both necessary and sufficient for persistence so that, as David 
Lewis claims, “what matters in survival is mental continuity and connectedness (1983a, 56).  
 On the second approach, which I will call the somatic approach, identity through time 
consists in some perhaps brute physical relation. A being at some future time is identical to you if 
and only if, for example, you share the same life, are the same animal, or have the same body or 
brain (Olson 2015, 1997 and Thomson 1197). What matters for survival on this approach is the 
sameness of a particular kind of physical object so that the problem of personal identity reduces to a 
more general problem of identity over time. 
While these approaches are very different from one another, they each agree that there is 
something that it takes for us to persist so that “our identity through time consists in or necessarily 
follows from something other than itself” (Olson 2015, 7). While there is disagreement concerning 
the base to which personal identity can be reduced and, in particular, whether this base is to be 
 81 
found in psychological relations or physical relations, there is agreement that personal identity can be 
reductively analyzed. A criterion of personal identity, stated in terms that are independent of 
personal identity, can be given.   
Unfortunately, attempts at reductive analysis making use of each of these approaches are 
uniformly subject to devastating counterexamples targeting the sufficiency of the analysis. The 
psychological continuity view, for example, is threatened by fission cases in which more than one 
future person is psychologically continuous with you even while each future person fails to be 
identical to the other. Because identity is plausibly transitive so that you cannot be identical with two 
non-identical future people, something more than continuity must be required. In contrast, the 
different versions of the somatic view are plagued by various transplant cases that preserve the brute 
physical relations in which personal identity is reduced while destroying the psychological features 
that, intuitively, matter.   
When a reductive analysis cannot be provided, as is suggested by the apparent failure of 
existing reductive analyses, that is taken to count as evidence in favor of Anticriterialism: the view 
that there is no true and informative theory of personal identity so that personal identity is a 
primitive notion (Merrick 1998). No sort of continuity is both necessary and sufficient for you to 
survive and so no informative criterion of identity is available for use in explaining why two things 
are identical to each other.  
While it does not follow from anticriterialism that your persistence or existence at a time is 
brute, unexplainable, or uncaused, it does follow that no informative explanation of what it is for a 
person to survive can be given. That your future self exists is explained causally and there is no need 
to explain why you are identical to your future self because identity facts are primitive and so they 
don’t require explanation (c.f. Merricks 1998). On this view, reductive accounts of survival, which 
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attempt to provide criteria of identity in terms of informative necessary and sufficient conditions for 
it, are bound to fail because what it is to survive over time cannot be analyzed or explained.  
 Existing accounts of personal identity either explain what it is for a person to survive by 
reducing personal identity to some further thing or argue that no true and informative explanation 
can be given for what it is to persist. However, by making use of metaphysical constraints and the 
explanatory characterizations that they underwrite, a third sort of account is possible. Like the 
anticriterialist, it is open to the constraintist to deny that survival over time can be reductively 
analyzed. However, it does not follow from this that there can be no true and informative 
explanation of what it is for a person to persist. Though no criteria of identity may be possible, the 
constraintist claims that an explanatorily deep characterization of survival over time is available 
nonetheless.  
 Perhaps a first approximation of such a constraintist account of persistence over time can be 
constructed from the most attractive pieces of reductive theories while disavowing the reductive 
aspirations of these theories. For example, a promising constraintist theory might adopt the 
psychological approach by identifying psychological continuity as a metaphysical constraint on 
persistence over time rather than as part of a reductive criterion of identity. On this view, a 
constitutive part of what it is for a future person to be identical to you is for that person to be 
psychologically continuous with you. Psychological continuity is necessary for persistence, on this 
view, but it need not be sufficient for it. As a result, a theory of personal identity on which 
psychological continuity is a constraint is not threatened by those challenges to sufficiency, like 
fission cases, that plague its reductionist cousins.  
This theory of personal identity over time can be developed making use of the psychological 
continuity constraint by exploring possible worlds via the IPA method defended in Chapter 1. 
Making use of this method requires us to identify and make suitably precise the psychological 
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continuity constraint and then to assess it by exploring possible worlds in which the constraint is and 
is not satisfied. The result, if all goes well, is a revealing test of the constraint that provides 
information about how personal identity must be and in what ways it can be different than it is.  
Metaphysical constraints underwrite a research project that is distinct from reductionism and 
is not threatened by the fact that psychological continuity is not sufficient for personal identity over 
time.  Though this research project need not secure a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, it 
will, if successful, secure an explanatorily deep characterization that provides an interesting and 
informative answer to the question of what it is for a person to be identical to some past or future 
thing by identifying constitutive parts of the nature of personal identity over time.  
 Although the Constraintist theory of personal identity rejects the project of uncovering a 
criterion of personal identity, and so is not a reductive view, it is not committed to the primitivism 
of anticriterialist views either. Constraintist theories offer explanations, underwritten by constraints, 
for what it is for a person to be identical to some past or future thing by identifying constitutive 
parts of the nature of diachronic identity. Though Constraintist theories are not reductive, they are 
unlike robust primitivism about personal identity in that they allow us to substantially extend our 
understanding of personal identity by explaining a great deal of what it is for one person to be 
identical to another.  
 It might be objected that the constraintist theory of personal identity provides what is at best 
a partial characterization of personal identity and so a partial explanation of what it is for a person to 
be identical to some past or future thing. In contrast, had a reductive account been available, it 
would have fully characterized and so fully explained identity over time. Because the constraintist 
theory provides a partial characterization, it falls short (so the objection goes) of explaining what it is 
for a person to be identical to some past or future thing.  
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 Though perhaps they might be complete in principle, I agree that constraintist theories are 
often partial. We don’t often have a complete grasp of the metaphysical constraints on the entities 
we wish to theorize about and to require a complete grasp is to set the bar for theorizing much too 
high. I do not agree, however, that it follows from this that any theory of personal identity 
underwritten by metaphysical constraints will fail to explain what it is for a person to be identical to 
some future thing: failing to provide a complete explanation is not the same as failing to provide an 
explanation tout court. When a theory is underwritten by an incomplete set of constraints, it 
provides a partial explanation of its target and such a partial explanation is a significant achievement, 
particularly in contexts in which no complete reductive explanation is forthcoming.  
 While the difference in completeness between them might be a reason to prefer reductive 
views to those underwritten by constraint in debates in which they are both available, I have argued 
that metaphysical constraints are important precisely because this is not often the case.14  It is not the 
case that reductive analysis is available, for example, in debates in which the Argument from 
Absence of Analysis is appropriate: that argument takes the actual or in principle failure of reduction 
as a premise. Furthermore, it is not the case that reductive analysis is readily available in those 
debates for which the new ground broken by constraints is most promising. In these debates, like 
the debate about personal identity, there is an impasse between reduction and primitivism so that 
each view is subject to significant objections making neither view attractive.  
Theories underwritten by constraints contribute to debates like this one by offering 
explanatory characterizations that are not vulnerable to existing objections, are informative, and do 
                                                
14 In fact, I am skeptical this we ought always prefer reductive views even under these circumstances. One reason for this 
is that I am skeptical that reductive views really are complete. It is plausible, for example, that what it is for a person to 
be identical to some future thing is exhausted by its reductive base. However, it seems to me that this reductive 
explanation reveals little about the nature of personal identity in absence of an explanatorily deep characterization of the 
reductive base to which personal identity is being reduced. In absence of a characterization of the reductive base, a 
reductive explanation of personal identity does nothing to characterize its target beyond pointing to some further thing. 
In contrast, metaphysical constraints are not often complete but do often illuminate the natures of their targets. It seems 
to me that we ought to prefer illuminating explanations to complete ones when doing metaphysics, though there is no 
need to stand on this controversial claim here.   
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not require reductions. Rather than mitigating objections to reductive and primitivist views, as fans 
of reduction and primitivism must, constraintist theories make their contribution by untangling 
ontological questions concerning whether and how personal identity can be reduced from 
explanatory questions concerning what it is to be identical to some future thing. As I’ve argued, the 
explanatory characterizations underwritten by metaphysical constraints are independent of the truth 
of reduction and minimal primitivism (and incompatible with robust primitivism): they can be had 
whether or not we can reduce personal identity to some more fundamental y. It is because of this 
independence that constraintist theories are not threatened by objections to reduction (and they are 
perhaps even bolstered by objections to robust primitivism). By providing such an attractive third 
option in debates in which neither reduction nor primitivism is appealing, theories underwritten by 
metaphysical constraints promise to break the impasse between existing views. 
6. Conclusion  
 
 Despite its widespread use, the Argument from Absence of Analysis is dubious. While the 
argument depends on a partition of logical space which divides the range of possible views between 
robust primitivism and reduction, I have argued that metaphysical constraints provide a middle path, 
securing the benefits of each kind of view without the costs of either. Like reductionist theories, 
Constraintist theories offer explanations for what it is to be their objects. Like primitivist theories, 
Constraintist theories are not hostage to the dim prospects for ontological reduction.  
Metaphysical constraints underwrite a general objection to the Argument from Absence of 
Analysis that applies uniformly to its instances wherever they occur. As a result, they make 
unavailable a central argument in favor of primitivism. However, metaphysical constraints also 
reveal new dialectical space in a range of philosophical debates so that by discovering that 
Constraintist theories are available, we are uncovering previously hidden dialectical space that has yet 
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to be explored. This new dialectical space is especially valuable when, as in the case of the debate 












1. New Resources 
 
 As we’ve now seen, metaphysical constraints are suited to do a range of theoretical and 
methodological work. They successfully resolve the puzzle of unequal treatment, they back the IPA 
method for theory development, underwrite a distinctive, top-down form of metaphysical 
explanation, animate a decisive case against the Argument from Absence of Analysis, and reveal 
hidden dialectical space in familiar debates like the one concerning the metaphysics of personal 
identity. Along the way, we saw how metaphysical constraints were distinct from competing notions 
and how the theories and explanations that they underwrite are different from more familiar 
examples backed by reduction or grounding.  
 What has emerged from this discussion is a picture of metaphysical theorizing in which 
metaphysical constraints occupy a central place. Though they do not replace important notions like 
reduction or dependence, they do offer a distinctive way of developing novel metaphysical theories, 
underwriting explanations, and of achieving what I consider to be a central aim of metaphysics: deep 
and explanatory characterizations.  
 It is worth emphasizing that metaphysical constraints underwrite theories and explanations 
in a way that is independent of more widely appreciated structuring relations like grounding and 
reduction: they don’t serve as grounds or reductive bases and don’t depend on successful reductive 
analysis. It is in part because of this independence that metaphysical constraints bring novel 
resources to the table and underwrite novel explanations and metaphysical theories.   
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 It is in virtue of this independence that metaphysical constraints also seem to outstrip 
existing accounts of what metaphysics does and at what metaphysical theories ought to aim. 
Metaphysical constraints seem not to fit, for example, with the broadly Quinean understanding of 
metaphysical theorizing according to which the aim of metaphysics is to say what there is. Though I 
have claimed that constraints occupy a central role in metaphysics, they do not do so because they 
help us to answer questions about existence and reduction. In much the same way, metaphysical 
constraints seem not to fit with a neo-Aristotelian understanding of metaphysics, at least as it is 
often construed.1 On this account, metaphysics aims to discover what is fundamental or what 
grounds what. Yet, metaphysical constraints are independent of grounding and so are of little help in 
illuminating the ontological dependence structure of the world.  
Though questions about what there is and about what is more fundamental than what have 
and should continue to play a significant structuring role both in first-order debates and in 
metaphysics more generally, metaphysical constraints suggest that the central aims of metaphysics 
cannot be achieved by these tools alone. 
2. Outstanding Questions 
While there is much to be gained in doing so, the inclusion of metaphysical constraints in the 
ideology of our best metaphysical theory also makes salient a range of outstanding questions in 
addition to those that have been highlighted in preceding chapters.  
Some of these outstanding questions concern the application of metaphysical constraints to 
first-order debates. For example, what progress can be made in debates, like those concerning the 
nature of causation and the metaphysics of laws, once we have understood them as debates about 
metaphysical constraints, as I have suggested in chapter one? Given that constraintist theories are 
                                                
1 In spite of this, the idea of natures is broadly neo-Aristotelian. As a result, I imagine that metaphysical constraints are 
consistent with some understanding of the aim of metaphysics along these lines. However, I think that a coherent 
statement of this view has yet to be seen. For further discussion of the Quinean and neo-Aristotelian accounts, see 
Schaffer 2009 and Quine 1980. 
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widely available, when are they attractive and how might they best be developed in order to move 
forward those debates in which they can be found? What illuminating metaphysical explanations by 
constraint can be offered in the context of these debates and what do they add to existing 
explanations backed by grounding or reduction? Finally, when if ever do metaphysical explanations 
by constraint outstrip other kinds of metaphysical explanations and so offer explanations that are 
genuinely new? 
Other outstanding questions concern broader methodological issues. I think that 
methodological features of the proceeding chapters suggest some interesting and, I hope promising 
areas for further work.  
One such area is suggested by the solution that I propose to the puzzle of unequal treatment 
in chapter one. This solution illustrates the way in which progress in first-order debates, like those 
that give rise to the puzzle, can be facilitated by clarifying and improving our understanding of the 
methodologies that these debates employ. In the case of the puzzle, methodological clarity 
concerning the handling of intuitive threats contributed to a better understanding of the first-order 
debates in which the puzzle emerged. For example, it helped us to understand why debates 
concerning e.g. the metaphysics of causation proceed in the way that they do, as well as which 
positions are available with respect to them.  
Metaphysical constraints are themselves an example of the first-order progress that can be 
made as a result of methodological reflection. They came into view by reflecting on the puzzle of 
unequal treatment, a puzzle about methodology. However, they open the way both for novel 
explanations of first-order facts and for novel constraintist positions in first-order debates. 
Conversely, metaphysical constraints illustrate the way in which opaque methodology seems to 
impede first-order progress. The roles played by metaphysical constraints, for example, are obscured 
by methodological views that are incomplete or otherwise deficient. The explanations underwritten 
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by metaphysical constraints and positions that are opened as a result of them are obscured when the 
broadly reductive, ontological aspirations of metaphysics are conflated with its explanatory ones, as 
when ontological reduction or grounding is conflated with metaphysical explanation.  
While I imagine that there are a variety of ways in which these contributions might be made, 
I think that it is true in general that clear methods will often lead to better outcomes in the first-
order debates that make use of them. This is particularly important given that explicit reflection on 
the methodology of metaphysics has been relatively scarce in recent years, despite a significant but 
subtle shift in the methodological center of gravity away from conceptual analysis.  
Another promising area of further work is suggested by the structural parallel, exploited in 
chapter two, between explanations in science and explanations in metaphysics: explanations of each 
kind come in different categories such that some work from the top-down and others are generative. 
It comes as no surprise that metaphysics ought to be informed by our best scientific theories. It is 
widely thought, for example, that our ontology (and perhaps our fundamental ontology) ought to be 
populated by those things that feature in our best scientific theories. However, the strategy used in 
chapter two to support metaphysical explanations by constraint illustrates another, less well 
appreciated, way by which metaphysical progress can be informed by science and philosophy of 
science.  
The structural parallel drawn on in the discussion concerning metaphysical explanation by 
constraint is a case in which the methodology of science informs the methodology of metaphysics: 
there is a systematic connection between the ways in which each discipline does its explanatory 
work. This suggests a noteworthy degree of methodological overlap between science and 
metaphysics that deserves further study. It seems to promise that metaphysical progress can be made 
by learning and applying hard fought lessons from the philosophy of science.  
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As these outstanding questions show, this dissertation contains what is likely to be a merely 
partial inventory of the interesting roles played by metaphysical constraints. I hope, nonetheless, that 
the interesting work that they have already been shown to perform is sufficient to demonstrate their 
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